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NOTE
TORT REFORM IN ALASKA:
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?
This Note discusses some of the provisions put into place by the
1997 Alaska Tort Reform Act, focusing on the Act’s punitive
damages caps, its adjustments to Alaska’s several liability system,
and the new statute of repose it enacts.  The Note argues that, even
though the 1997 Act was very controversial at the time it was
passed, the laws that it enacts will have little effect on most Alaska
tort victims.  In reality, the number of awards affected by this Act
are minimal, and a study of Alaska jury verdicts reveals that most
large damages awards are reduced on appeal.  Similarly, the joint
and several liability reforms and the new statute of repose make, at
best, cosmetic changes to Alaska tort law that will have little effect
on the average Alaska tort victim.  The Note concludes that the
controversy over the tort bill, as far as the average Alaska citizen
is concerned, is really “much ado about nothing.”
If we want an environment that is conducive to rational eco-
nomic development, the creation of jobs and a higher standard
of living for all Alaskans, enactment of meaningful tort reform is
paramount.  Mere token reform is not enough.  Every Alaskan
should thoroughly understand that the stakes are high, and the
battle will not be easy, but that we can prevail.1
Welcome to the brave new world of corporatism, compliments of
corporate director Brian Porter and HB 58 (tort reform).  Those
50 words of the Seventh Amendment are dead and the malig-
nancy is [spreading] to the others.  HB 58 is right out of the
pages of Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and Karl Marx’s “Das
Capital.”  Our legal system is now privatized and our state CEO
Copyright © 1999 by Alaska Law Review.  This article is also available on the
World Wide Web at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/16ALRStidvent.
1. Brian Porter, Tort Reform Must Be Meaningful To Be Effective, AN-
CHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 28, 1997, at B10.
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will sign it into law.  Corporatism now governs us.  What hap-
pened to America?2
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Alaska State Legislature approved yet another
controversial bill reforming the state’s tort law system.3  Among
other things, this bill capped punitive and non-economic damages
awards in Alaska, continued the state liability allocation system’s
metamorphosis from joint and several liability to pure several li-
ability, and enacted a new statute of repose of ten years.4  This bill
did not become law without a fight.5  Businesses and the Alaska in-
surance industry lobbied hard for its passage.6  These groups ar-
2. Joseph T. Dugan, Letters From the People, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 7, 1997, at B5.
3. 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 26 (codified as ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.010-
09.17.900) (LEXIS 1998)).
4. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (LEXIS 1998) (establishing new statute of
repose); id. § 09.17.010 (capping non-economic damages); id. § 09.17.020 (capping
punitive damages); id. § 09.17.080(a) (modifying several liability provisions).
Among other things, the 1997 Tort Reform Act also made various rules regarding
expert witness qualification, offers of judgment, attorney contingent fee agree-
ments, and “damages resulting from commission of a felony or while under influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs.” Id. § 09.65.210(1), (3)(B)(4) (barring a person from re-
covering damages for injury or death if that person was committing a felony at the
time of the death or injury and that felony “substantially contributed to the per-
sonal injury or death,” or, among other things, if that person were “operating a
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
any controlled substance” and that conduct substantially contributed to the per-
son’s injury or death); see also id. § 09.20.185 (requiring testifying expert wit-
nesses to be trained and licensed professionals); id. § 09.30.065 (requiring offeree
to pay opponent’s costs and attorney’s fees if final judgment rendered is “at least
five percent less” than the opponent’s pre-trial offer); id. § 09.60.080 (requiring
attorney contingency fees to be calculated on damages before any punitive dam-
ages have been deducted from the award).
In the interests of space, this Note does not consider all of these changes to
Alaska’s tort law system embodied in the 1997 Tort Reform Act.  Instead, this
Note chooses to examine only the punitive damages caps, the reforms to the li-
ability allocation system, and the statute of repose amendments.
5. See Maureen Clark, Tort Reform Bill Is Law; Jury Awards Capped,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 10, 1997, at E1 (“‘I started this [tort reform leg-
islation] the first year that I got into the Legislature and this is the fifth year.
Needless to say, it’s the only thing that’s taken five years,’ [Representative Brian
Porter, (R-Anchorage)] said.”).
6. See Natalie Phillips, Suit Sets Sights on Tort-Reform Law; Lawyers Say
Measure Limiting Civil Awards Unjust, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 18, 1998,
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gued that defending meritless lawsuits and paying high non-
compensatory damages awards harmed the Alaska business envi-
ronment and kept the prices of insurance premiums unnaturally
high.7  Leading the charge for the other side, groups of Alaska trial
attorneys fought against the bill.8  They contended that damages
caps unjustly discriminate against tort victims with high damages,
that several liability foretells the possibility of unpaid tort verdicts,
and that there is “no guarantee that the reforms will lower insur-
ance rates.”9
Judging from the rhetoric employed by each side, all groups in
this fight have the best interests of the average Alaska citizen at
heart.10  One side fights to keep Alaska’s business environment
healthy and sane, while the other works to protect and defend the
fundamental rights of Alaska tort victims.  Both of these are cer-
tainly admirable goals, and it is no wonder that tort reform in
Alaska has created such controversy.  Equally disturbing are the
images of a business driven into bankruptcy by an undeservingly
large punitive damages award and a tort victim who cannot recover
for her injuries because of arbitrary and unjust damages caps.
Clearly, if the tort system in Alaska routinely led to such results,
then reform would be necessary.
Yet, for all the bluster, as far as average Alaska tort victims
and citizens are concerned, tort reform advocates and their oppo-
nents are engaged in little more than much ado about nothing.
Like most tort reform legislation, the 1997 Tort Reform Act did
                                                                                                                                
at B1 (noting that members of industry, medicine and insurance organizations or-
ganized a “hard push” for the bill’s passage).
7. See Natalie Phillips, Tort Reform Battle Heats Up in Juneau; Both Sides
Appeal to Human Element, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1997, at B1
(“[Reformers] say the cost of defending frivolous lawsuits and rising insurance
premiums stifle business.”).
8. See Phillips, supra note 6, at B1 (noting that “state trial lawyers fought
hard to block the law’s passage”).
9. Id. at B1; see also Kevin Sean Mahoney, Note, Alaska’s Cap on Non-
economic Damages: Unfair, Unwise and Unconstitutional, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 67,
72 (1994) (“A common argument raised by those challenging the constitutionality
of damages caps has been that such caps violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection.”).
10. According to Governor Tony Knowles, “[the bill] recognizes the need for
Alaska businesses to operate in a reasonably predictable environment.”  Maureen
Clark, Gov. Knowles signs measure limiting civil liability, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL.
SERVICE, May 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2524193.  Mauri Long, then-
president of the Alaska Academy of Trial Lawyers, said, “I think that, overall, the
impact will be that it will be more difficult for regular folks who are injured to
bring cases when they are not offered a settlement by an insurance company that
is reasonable.”  Ingrid Martin, Tort Reform Law Gives Fans, Foes Much to Con-
sider, ALASKA J. COM. 1, Dec. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 15283956.
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not address significant elements of Alaska tort law and it will not
have a lasting impact on Alaska tort victims.11  What little effect
the bill has mainly will involve only those groups who fought so
strenuously for and against it.  Big businesses and insurance com-
panies, who are commonly the defendants and the financially re-
sponsible parties in tort suits, have won a reprieve from a handful
of large damages awards made each year.12  Trial lawyers have lost
the chance to secure the occasional big punitive or non-economic
damages award for their clients and correspondingly large contin-
gency fees for themselves.13  The large majority of Alaska tort vic-
tims have not lost anything, for the 1997 Tort Reform Act makes
only a few relatively minor changes to a tort system in which few
Alaska citizens participate anyway.14
In its reforms of Alaska’s damages allocation system, the bill
makes some minor changes that do little more than overturn a few
Alaska Supreme Court holdings and alter the outcomes of some
very fact-specific situations.15  While the bill implements some new
damages caps, a study of Alaska tort verdicts illustrates that the
11. But see Voice of the Times, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 1998 at D9
(“Regarding lower rates, early benefits already have been achieved.  State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and United Services Automobile Asso-
ciation have just announced rebates totaling about $12 million for Alaska policy-
holders.  The rebates, the insurance companies said, are attributable in part to
tort reform.  State Farm also has reduced auto insurance rates in Alaska by an
average 2.4 percent.”).  Of course, insurance companies were some of the prime
supporters of the 1997 Tort Reform Act, and could be expected to laud its bene-
fits to the public once it had passed.  See Keeping States on Course, Bus. Ins. 8,
1997 WL 8294967 (June 30, 1997) (insurance industry publication approvingly
noting the passage of Alaska’s tort reform package).
12. See, e.g., Andrew F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing
the Vulnerable, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 126-27 (1998) (discussing the battle in
the U.S. Congress between consumer advocates and business interests over the
passage of the tort-reforming 1997 Volunteer Protection Act, and dismissing in-
surance and industry justifications for tort reform as “the polite stuff of lobby-
ing”).  Popper argues that “[t]he [tort-reform] bills proposed and the laws passed
provide no protection for consumers, furnish no incentive for greater safety, and
significantly constrict the rights of the powerless, arguments about promoting
‘market opportunity’ notwithstanding.”  Id. at 127.
13. See Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 863-64 (1996) (identifying plaintiff’s lawyers interests in
keeping the potential for large damages awards in the tort system).
14. See, e.g., Gil B. Fried, Punitive Damages and Corporate Liability Analysis
in Sports Litigation, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 45, 51-52 (1998) (noting that scholars
have wondered why the general public is not more involved in the tort reform
movement and hypothesizing that “[t]he lack of public conviction can be traced to
the limited number of tort claims that are actually filed”).
15. See infra notes 108-72 and accompanying text.
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caps would have restricted full damages recovery in only a handful
of cases over the past few years.16  Punitive and non-economic
damages rarely are awarded in Alaska tort cases, and they are al-
most never awarded at amounts that would be reduced by the new
caps.17  So while the beat goes on, and each side makes the same
impassioned arguments, what Alaskans should have learned from
the continuing debate is that they should not have paid much at-
tention to it in the first place.  For most Alaskans, and for most
Alaskan tort victims, tort reform will make little difference.
Part II of this Note briefly details the development of the con-
temporary tort reform movement in the United States over the
past fifteen years.  Part III examines Alaska tort reform from 1986
– when Alaska first capped damages and made its real shift from
joint and several to several liability – to 1997.  Part IV discusses the
provisions of the 1997 Tort Reform Act, focusing on the bill’s shift
toward several liability, its new statute of repose, and its new puni-
tive and non-economic damages caps.  Part V concludes that, while
some of the bill’s damage apportionment modifications helped
complete Alaska’s move to a several liability system, these changes
mostly are cosmetic and will do little to affect Alaska’s liability al-
location scheme.  Tort victims who use a little foresight when con-
ducting their lawsuits will be no worse off than they were before
the 1997 Tort Reform Act passed.  Tort victims also should have
little problem successfully navigating the 1997 Tort Reform Act’s
new statute of repose.  In addition, the damages caps included in
the 1997 bill may make Alaska businesses feel better, but they will
do little to modify tort law outcomes in Alaska.  This Note ulti-
mately contends that tort reform, as it has been experienced in
Alaska, does little to address the concerns of those who should
have been the most directly affected by its passage – tort victims.
If meaningful tort reform is needed in Alaska, it will not come
from a bill such as this.
II. TORT REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
State legislatures throughout the United States addressed
their tort systems in the 1970s and again in the 1980s.18  In the mid-
1970s, many states enacted tort reform measures to counteract the
“medical malpractice crisis.”19  In 1986, more than sixty percent of
16. See infra notes 173-237 and accompanying text.
17. See id.
18. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 504 (1998) (discussing these two “most recent
waves” of tort reform).
19. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in
Medical Malpractice, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 429 (1992) (observing that, since the
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the states again passed tort reform to safeguard the availability of
liability insurance.20  During each reform wave, state legislatures
                                                                                                                                
mid-1970s, most states have enacted tort reform dealing with medical malpractice
lawsuits); see also Chamallas, supra note 18, at 503-04 (describing the medical
malpractice tort reform measures enacted in the 1970s as indicative of a “damages
hierarchy” in which non-economic (or non-pecuniary) damages are “less essential
to a fair system of compensation than damages for economic loss”); Glen O.
Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970’s: A Retrospective, 49 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6-27 (1986) (summarizing the medical malpractice crisis
events of the early to mid-1970s and its tort reform responses, and noting that the
tort reform changes of the 1970s at least had the appearance of immediately ad-
dressing the medical malpractice crisis, whether or not they caused any lasting
changes in the system).  Robinson concludes that the tort reform measures en-
acted by the states to counteract the medical malpractice crisis were “more show
than substance.”  Robinson, supra, at 30.  With regard to the reform measures
contemplated in the 1980s at the perceived renewal of the medical malpractice
crisis, Robinson notes:
If, as the saying goes, past is prologue, it is difficult to foresee any major
tort reform arising out of the 1980’s update of the malpractice crisis of
the 1970’s.  A continuation of political wrestling between the medical
profession and the plaintiff’s bar, accompanied by state legislatures’ fit-
ful intervention to convey their “concern” to both constituencies by
making some marginal adjustments in liability-related rules, is more
likely to occur.
Id. at 35.
20. See Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic
Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 628, 628 n.1 (1988) (noting that of the states not enacting tort
reform legislation in that year, seven did not have legislative sessions, several oth-
ers considered legislation, and some others set up committees to examine tort re-
form).  Such action was relatively rare at the time, as tort law generally was made
by judicial opinion, not by legislation.  See Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the
Tort System,  50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (“Tort law in America is built on the
bedrock of state common law.”).
A 1994 study examined the results of state tort reform initiatives enacted in
the mid-1980s in Colorado and New York, and concluded that these initiatives did
not make much difference.  As one author wrote:
The 1986 tort reform measures enacted in Colorado were viewed as con-
stituting a major overhaul of the state’s liability structure.  Four changes
were thought important: 1) Joint and several liability was entirely abol-
ished; 2) Non-economic damages were limited to $25,000; 3) The statute
of limitations for civil actions was shortened from four years to two
years; and 4) Court awards were to be reduced by the amounts received
from other (collateral) sources.
Following reforms, the general liability loss ratios in Colorado dropped
sharply and remained relatively stable.  Other things apparently re-
maining more or less constant; the general liability insurance carriers be-
came more profitable.  The authors of the study put this rather artfully
in their abstract: “(t)he liability reform measures generated a onetime
shift in the profitability of general  liability insurance.”
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created laws aimed at combating alleged public fears that the tort
system was running out of control and wreaking havoc in various
industries such as medicine and insurance.21  In the 1970s, legisla-
tures identified public worries that increasing medical malpractice
claims were raising physician insurance costs to the point that such
costs would lead to a decrease in the availability of essential medi-
cal services.22  In 1986, legislatures reacted to a nationwide
“insurance crisis” in an expression of “concern about the decreas-
ing availability and rising cost of liability insurance”23 that they
blamed partially on the burgeoning tort law system.24  This latter
“crisis” was characterized by the inability of businesses and mu-
nicipalities to obtain the insurance they needed at reasonable
prices.25  Because of the increased price of insurance and its total
unavailability for some activities, certain businesses, and even
some municipalities, remained uninsured or had to dramatically
increase the prices of their goods and services.26
                                                                                                                                
Philip Shuchman, It Isn’t That the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It’s Just That the
Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 485, 536 (1997) (quoting W.
Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, The Performance of the Liability Reform Experi-
ments: New York and Colorado, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 1, 1 (1994)).
21. See, e.g., W. John Thomas, The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: A Critical
Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 459, 460 (1992) (“Increases in
the frequency and severity (or size) of [medical malpractice] claims in the 1960s
and 1970s caused cries of outrage in the medical profession and general public
alike.”).
22. See Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths
and Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 153-54 (1997) (“Unexpected and
dramatic growth in claims during the 1970s led to a rapid growth in physician
malpractice insurance premiums, in some cases sufficient to threaten the con-
tinuing availability of valued specialty services (for example, obstetrical services
in some states).”); see also Elizabeth Swire Falker, The Medical Malpractice Crisis
in Obstetrics: A Gestalt Approach to Reform, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 2-4
(1997) (observing that many obstetricians ceased to practice because they were
being sued so frequently, and the rate at which they were sued caused their insur-
ance premiums to rise dramatically).
23. Mahoney, supra note 9, at 67.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 67-68.
26. The lack of adequate insurance coverage, if it existed, certainly would
have been noticed in a state like Alaska, which is “especially dependent on the
insurance industry.”  David G. Stebing, Insurance Regulation in Alaska: Healthy
Exercise of a State Prerogative, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 279, 309 (1993) (describing the
scheme for insurance regulation in Alaska and emphasizing that this regulation is
a state function).  As one author has written, “[w]hether on land or at sea, re-
gardless of occupation, Alaskans are more likely to die on the job than workers
anywhere else in the nation.”  See id. (quoting Doug O’Harra, Man Overboard!,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 2, 1993, at D10).  O’Harra’s article indicates that
during the 1980s, the yearly number of job-related deaths in Alaska was five times
STIDVENT.CONVERT 05/07/99  11:21 AM
68 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:1
Critics and scholars disagreed as to the causes of this “crisis”
in insurance pricing and availability, with many failing to see any
connection at all between rising insurance prices and expanding
tort liability.27  A consortium of insurance companies and sizeable
corporations, joined by the Reagan Administration, blamed the
tort law system for their financial woes. 28  Many “consumer advo-
cates,” on the other hand, argued that the insurance industry only
sought to profit from a natural, self-generated downturn in profit-
ability by reforming the tort system to their advantage. 29  The two
sides were well-defined and their arguments were forcefully clear.
                                                                                                                                
the national average, while commercial fishermen perish “at an annual rate about
25 times greater than the national average for on-the-job fatalities.”  Id. at 309
(quoting O’Harra, at D8).  Stebing notes that Alaskans are at risk of drowning in
the unusually cold waters, threatened by potentially devastating earthquakes, and
“plagued [by] employment and environmental hazards,” before concluding that
“the risks of living in Alaska mandate the presence of financially sound insurance
companies.”  Id. at 309-10.
A Governor’s Task Force on Regulatory Reform addressed the insurance
question in Alaska in 1993.  See id. at 310.  This Task Force concluded in part that
“[t]he cost of health and other insurance and bonding is prohibitive for most small
businesses,” and recommended, as one of many potential solutions, instituting
tort reform in Alaska.  See id. (quoting GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON
REGULATORY REFORM, FINAL REPORT (Mar. 19, 1993)).
27. See Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2024
(1998) (describing the 1980s insurance crisis as one “that many commentators be-
lieve was caused by the cyclical effect of changes in interest rates on insurance
premiums and collusion by the insurance industry”); see also Popper, supra note
12, at 131-32 (categorizing insurance industry claims that the “insurance crisis” is
attributable to the tort law system as “baseless”).
28. See James J. Scheske, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Theory: A
Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. OF AIR L. & COM. 627, 632 (1988) (“On the one
hand a coalition of insurance companies and large corporations allegedly formed
a powerful political coalition promoting reform of the tort system to control es-
calating costs.  The Reagan Administration led the fight for reform as well.”
(citations omitted)).
29. See Ralph Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims’ Rights, 22
GONZ. L. REV. 15, 18 (1986/1987) (describing tort reform as “one of the most un-
principled public relations scams in the history of the American industry”).
Nader notes:
The “insurance crisis” has little to do with lawsuits.  It is a self-inflicted
phenomenon which last occurred in the mid-seventies, and invariably
provokes frenetic talk of a litigation explosion, with calls for legislative
limits on victim’s rights.  The current cycle began several years ago when
interest rates were high.  The industry cut prices and insured poor risks
in order to obtain premium dollars to invest at these high rates.  When
interest rates, and this investment income, dropped, the industry re-
sponded by sharply increasing insurance premiums and reducing avail-
ability . . . .
Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
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In one corner stood “big business,” arguing that tort reform was
necessary for it to avoid bankruptcy.  In the other stood trial attor-
neys and victims’ advocates, claiming that reform was a
“degradation of the just norms of the common law” and a danger
to tort victims everywhere.30
Legislative action in 1986 illustrates that tort reformers car-
ried much of the day.31 Many states modified and often eliminated
joint and several liability, a liability allocation system that holds
each tortfeasor whose conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s
indivisible injury potentially liable for that plaintiff’s full dam-
ages.32  Under this system, a tortfeasor responsible for ten percent
of a plaintiff’s injuries could find itself financially responsible for
one hundred percent of the plaintiff’s recovery, if concurrent tort-
feasors were insolvent or immune.33  Industries argued that joint
and several liability treated financially responsible entities unfairly
by perpetuating a system in which injured victims would sue mar-
ginally responsible “deep pockets” to guarantee compensation for
their injuries.34  The states responded to the concerns raised by op-
ponents of joint and several liability by enacting a number of dif-
30. Id. at 29.
31. See Manzer, supra note 20, at 633-35.  The author points out that numer-
ous other reforms were enacted by state legislatures during the 1986 legislative
sessions, but that the two here mentioned (modification of joint and several li-
ability and caps on non-economic damages) were those most widely enacted by
the state legislatures.  See id.  Other reforms adopted include “eliminating the
collateral source rule, reestablishing many sovereign immunities, limiting liability
for certain activities or actors, providing for periodic rather than lump-sum award
payments, and limiting punitive damages.”  Id. at 633-34 (footnotes omitted).
32. See id. at 635.
33. See Jonathan Cardi, Note, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Non-
parties: An Argument Based on Comparative Responsibility and the Proposed Re-
statement (Third) of Torts, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1300 (1997) (describing a case
in which a party one percent at fault paid eighty-six percent of the victim’s dam-
ages).
34. See Note, “Common Sense” Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Re-
form, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1996).  According to the author, “[c]lassical
reformers stressed that it was normatively unfair to hold a single defendant fully
liable when that defendant was only remotely involved in causing the harm.”  Id.
The author distinguishes between these classical tort reformers, who “call for the
elimination of legal rules that are particularly expensive for defendants,” id. at
1767, and modernist tort reformers, who “recognize that, although many of the
pro-plaintiff common law rules adopted in the Progressive Era have defects, these
rules serve important insurance and deterrence functions.”  Id. at 1771.  The
author notes that many modernist tort reformers are actually in favor of joint and
several liability, or at least “more supportive” of it than most classical tort re-
formers.  Id. at 1777.
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ferent provisions designed to allay some of the perceived unfair-
ness of this system.35
In 1986, many states also capped the non-economic and puni-
tive damages that a jury could award a tort victim.36  Non-economic
damages are damages for intangible injuries such as pain and suf-
fering.37  The 1986 caps set limits in a range from $250,000 to
$875,000 on the amount of damages a jury could award.38  Punitive
damages constitute money awarded “to plaintiffs in excess of full
compensation for their injuries.”39  They usually are justified as
necessary to punish particularly malevolent tortfeasors and to de-
ter similar conduct by others.40  Reformers frequently argued that
punitive damages were “out of control,” and pointed to large jury
verdicts that included substantial punitive damage awards as evi-
dence of their claims.41  Opponents of the 1986 damages caps at-
tacked them as a violation of victims’ equal protection guarantees,
in that they discriminated against tort victims whose damages ex-
ceeded the amount they could recover.42
  
In the following years, a
number of state courts struck down these caps as unconstitu-
tional.43  Nevertheless, by 1986, tort reformers had won sizeable
victories in states all over the country.
35. See Cardi, supra note 33, at 1302-03.
36. See Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Be-
yond the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247, 297 (1997) (noting that several state
legislatures capped punitive damages in the 1980s); see also Mahoney, supra note
9, at 72 (noting that, in 1986, more than thirty states in addition to Alaska passed
tort reform, and that many of these tort reform measures contained non-economic
damages caps).
37. Non-economic damages have been defined in Alaska as “compensation
for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of
enjoyment of life and other non-pecuniary damages.”  Mahoney, supra note 9, at
68 n.4 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Michie Supp. 1993)).
38. See Manzer, supra note 20, at 637.  New Hampshire set the highest cap, at
$875,000, while Colorado established the lowest at $250,000 “unless clear and
convincing evidence indicates greater damages warranted.”  Id. at 637 n.56.
39. Philip Ackerman, Some Don’t Like It Hot: Louisiana Eliminates Punitive
Damages For Environmental Torts, 72 TUL. L. REV. 327, 328 (1997).
40. See id. at 329-30; see also Salbu, supra note 36, at 250-59 (discussing posi-
tions of punitive damages supporters and opponents in the tort reform battle).
41. See Ackerman, supra note 39, at 335 (citing Alex Kozinski, Editorial, The
Case of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A14).
42. See generally Mahoney, supra note 9.
43. See David A. Saichek, Putting a Lid on Caps, 69 WIS. LAW. 5, 5 (Dec.
1996) (noting that, as of December 1996, caps on non-economic damages had
been struck down in Oregon and Washington, and caps in medical malpractice
cases had been found unconstitutional in Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, New
Hampshire, Alabama and Ohio).
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III. TORT REFORM IN ALASKA, 1986-1997
The Alaska legislature first took on the task of reforming the
tort system in 1976, when it addressed the “crisis in medical mal-
practice insurance” by passing a series of laws designed to lower
the cost of medical malpractice insurance.44  In 1986, in response to
the “insurance crisis,” the Alaska legislature acted again and
passed the Limitations on Civil Liability Act.45  This Act began
44. See 1976 Alaska Sess. Laws 102 (codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.530-
09.55.560) (Michie 1996); Reid v. Williams, 964 P.2d 453, 456 (Alaska 1998)
(discussing a provision of the 1976 “comprehensive medical malpractice reform
package intended to alleviate a perceived crisis in medical malpractice insurance
costs”); Plumley v. Hale, 594 P.2d 497, 498 n.3 (Alaska 1979) (“Chapter 102 SLA
1976 established a comprehensive system to furnish hospitals and individual
health care providers with medical malpractice insurance.”).
45. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Michie 1996); see also Laurence Keyes,
Alaska’s Apportionment of Damages Statute: Problems for Litigants, 9 ALASKA L.
REV. 1, 1-3, 9-14 (1992) (summarizing Alaska Supreme Court cases prior to 1986
and detailing the passage of the 1986 Act).  Keyes provides an excellent analysis
of the 1986 damages allocation system statute.  See generally id.  The text of the
original Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080 reads:
Apportionment of damages.  (a)  In all actions involving fault of more
than one party to the action, including third-party defendants and per-
sons who have been released under [Alaska Statutes section] 09.16.040,
the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to
answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings
indicating
(1)  the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to re-
cover if contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2)  the percentage of the total fault of all of the parties to each claim
that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and
person who has been released from liability under [Alaska Statutes sec-
tion] 09.16.040.
(b)  In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall con-
sider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault, and the extent
of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.
The trier of fact may determine that two or more persons are to be
treated as a single party if their conduct was a cause of the damages
claimed and the separate act or omission of each person cannot be dis-
tinguished.
(c)  The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in
accordance with the findings, subject to a reduction under [Alaska Stat-
utes section] 09.16.040, and enter judgment against each party liable.
The court also shall determine and state in the judgment each party’s
equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the
respective percentages of fault.
(d)  The court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis
of joint and several liability, except that a party who is allocated less
than 50 percent of the total fault allocated to all the parties may not be
jointly liable for more than twice the percentage of fault allocated to that
party.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Michie 1986), reprinted in Keyes, supra, at 2 n.5.
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Alaska’s transformation to a several liability system and placed
statutory limits on certain damages.46  Because it was in the 1980s,
and not in 1997, that Alaska switched from joint and several liabil-
ity to a several liability system, the 1997 legislature had little
ground left to cover when it made further modifications to
Alaska’s liability allocation scheme with the 1997 Tort Reform
Act.  By 1997, there was not much of Alaska’s old damages scheme
left to reform.
A. Joint and Several Liability in Alaska, 1986-1997
Before 1986, the Alaska Supreme Court had indicated that it
would be “receptive to both proportionate fault and proportionate
contribution,” two important elements in a several liability sys-
tem.47  With the 1986 Tort Reform Bill, the Alaska legislature be-
gan putting into place just such a system.48  In turn, this damage
apportionment scheme was amended by a voter initiative that
moved Alaska even farther toward several liability.49  This oc-
curred in 1987, when the Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform
fought for a ballot initiative and successfully amended Alaska
Statutes section 09.17.080(d), the section in the 1986 Act that had
retained some vestiges of the concurrent tortfeasor joint and sev-
eral liability apportionment system.50  Section (d), prior to amend-
ment, had provided that “a party who is allocated less than fifty
percent of the total fault allocated to all the parties may not be
jointly liable for more than twice the percentage of fault allocated
to that party.”51  The new liability allocation system, which went
into effect on March 5, 1989,  provides that “[t]he court shall enter
judgment against each party liable on the basis of several liability
in accordance with that party’s percentage of fault.”52
46. See Keyes, supra note 45, at 15 (noting that, in 1986, “the legislature set-
tled on a version of the act which provided for modified joint and several liabil-
ity”).
47. Id. at 9.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 15-18.  Keyes identifies Lake v. Construction Machinery, 787
P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990), as a case dealing with this pre-ballot initiative.  The
Alaska Supreme Court there explained the operation of Alaska Statutes section
09.17.080 by saying, “[u]nder the new statute, the finder of fact must fix the dam-
age awards, and determine the respective percentages of fault.  The court then
enters judgment on the basis of modified joint and several liability.”  Id. at 13
(quoting Lake, 787 P.2d at 1029-30 (citations omitted)).
50. See id. at 15-18.
51. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (Michie 1986) (before repeal).
52. Id. § 09.17.080(d) (LEXIS 1998).  See Hughes v. Foster Wheeler Co.,  932
P.2d 784, 792 (Alaska 1997) for an interesting note on the reach of Alaska Stat-
utes section 09.17.080.  In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that, while
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Subsequent cases applying this new post-ballot initiative Tort
Reform Act made clear that, by 1989, Alaska had a several liability
system.  As the U.S. District Court summarized in FDIC v. Whit-
more,53
[f]or claims for torts which occurred prior to June 11, 1986, the
Alaska Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act applies
retroactively; for torts occurring between June 11, 1986, and
March 5, 1989, the Alaska Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act applies, as modified by the Tort Reform Act of 1986,
AS 09.17.010.900; for claims for torts which occurred after
March 5, 1989, pure comparative fault principles, with no right of
contribution, apply.
 54
This view of the post-ballot Tort Reform Act as a statute enacting
several liability in Alaska is consistent in all of the cases interpret-
ing the section.  For instance, in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,55 the
Ninth Circuit characterized the 1986 Tort Reform Act as codifying
“the Alaska Supreme Court’s adoption of comparative negli-
gence.”56  It further described the 1997 damages allocation system
amendments as “minor textual changes.”57  In Robinson v. Alaska
Properties and Investment, Inc.,58 the U.S. District Court sitting in
Alaska also characterized Alaska’s damages allocation system as
one in which joint and several liability had been abolished, with
several liability replacing it.59  According to the court, the state of
                                                                                                                                
the statute mandated that several liability be applied to findings of fault, joint and
several liability was still acceptable when attorney’s fees were being determined.
See id.  As the court wrote,
the clear implication [of Alaska Civil Rule 82(e)] is that, in types of liti-
gation where [Alaska Statute section] 09.17.080 is not invoked, attor-
ney’s fees need not be apportioned by fault.  Here there were no dam-
ages awarded pursuant to 09.17.080, and it follows that the statute is
inapplicable to the award of attorney’s fees and costs in this case.
Id.  Other Alaska cases similarly have identified that holding parties jointly and
severally liable for attorney’s fees and costs is within the discretion of the courts.
See, e.g., In re Soldotna Air Crash Litigation, 835 P.2d 1215, 1223 (Alaska 1992);
Moses v. McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363, 1367-68 (Alaska 1980).  But see Noffsinger v.
State, 850 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1993) (finding that Alaska Statutes section
09.17.080(d) “has no direct bearing in the criminal context, where the court’s
authority to require payment of restitution exists independently of its authority to
order payment of damages in civil matters”).
53. No. A92-0060-CV, 1994 WL 594607 (D. Alaska Feb. 11, 1994).
54. Id. at *3 n.20 (emphasis added).
55. Nos. 96-35072, 96-35121, 96-35523, 96-35968, 1998 WL 80630 (9th Cir.
Apr. 14, 1998).
56. Id. at *3; see also Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) (establishing
comparative negligence in Alaska).
57. Id. at *4 n.4.
58. 878 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Alaska 1995).
59. See id. at 1322.
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the law in Alaska in 1995 was that “the plaintiff may recover from
each potential tortfeasor who is joined as a party, only the propor-
tion that his fault bears to [the] total damages.”60
The Alaska Supreme Court’s only real concerns with the im-
plications of the 1980s reforms to the liability allocation system
were in the details.  In Ogle v. Craig Taylor Equipment Co.,61 the
court had to interpret the Tort Reform Act’s language that it ap-
plied to “all causes of action accruing after [its] effective date.”62
The court was required to decide whether this language referred to
the time at which the plaintiff acquired his tort cause of action, or
the time at which the plaintiff subsequently perfected his action for
contribution.63  In Ogle, the plaintiff’s tort cause of action had ac-
crued prior to the passage of the Tort Reform Act, while his cause
of action for contribution had accrued after its passage.64
The Ogle plaintiff had sued two concurrent tortfeasors who
caused his injury, and settled with one.65  The settling defendant
then assigned its contribution claim against the other defendant to
the plaintiff Ogle.66  Ogle then sued the remaining defendant for
contribution, but the lower court ruled that the defendant was li-
able under the 1986 Tort Reform Act only for contribution related
to its relative fault.67  This amount was less than the pro rata con-
tribution amount the defendant would have been liable for under
the law prior to the 1986 Tort Reform Act.68
The Alaska Supreme Court decided that the Act would apply
only when the plaintiff’s injury occurred on or after June 11, 1986
(effective date of Act).69  In the absence of clear legislative intent
one way or another, this policy ensured that a tortfeasor’s liability
for an accident occurring prior to June 11, 1986 would not subse-
quently change in amount after the date when the cause of action
for contribution arose. 70  Here, this decision also ensured that the
60. Id.
61. 761 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1988).
62. Id. at 724 (quoting Tort Reform Act, June 11, 1986. Ch. 139 §§ 9, 11, SLA
1986).
63. See id.; see also Caspersen v. Alaska Workers’ Compensation Bd., 786
P.2d 914, 915 (Alaska 1990) (upholding rule reached in Ogle).
64. See Ogle, 761 P.2d at 724.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 725.
70. See id. at 724-25.  The court cited Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-Ray Corp.,
638 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1981), as the only other case that it had found directly on
point.  See 761 P.2d at 725.  There, the Third Circuit had ruled that “the change
from equal shares to contribution according to relative fault affected substantive
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non-settling defendant lived up to the agreement made between
the plaintiff and the settling defendant.  If the Alaska Supreme
Court had ruled otherwise, the non-settling defendant would have
had the benefit of using the 1986 Tort Reform Act to reduce its
contribution payment, even though the plaintiff and the settling
defendant seemed to have formed an agreement based on the be-
lief that the pre-1986 Tort Reform Act contribution requirements
would apply to all parties.
In Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corporation (Lycoming Divi-
sion),71 Borg-Warner was a defendant who sued several third-party
defendants for contribution.72  The court refused to allow Borg-
Warner to join these contribution claims to the trial where it was
found liable for the victim’s death, and ordered that they must be
decided at a separate trial.73  On appeal, Borg-Warner argued that
the pre-ballot initiative Tort Reform Act required the jury to allo-
cate comparative fault among both first- and third-party claims all
at one time.74  However, the Alaska Supreme Court found nothing
in the statute’s legislative history that supported this view, and held
that “in certain circumstances a separate trial allocating fault
among first- and third-party defendants is appropriate.”75
In Navistar International Transportation Corporation v. Pleas-
ant,76 the Alaska Supreme Court decided, among other things, that
the trial court had not erred when it refused to allow prejudgment
interest on the victim’s damages for future non-economic and eco-
nomic losses.77  Prior to the 1986 Tort Reform Act, prejudgment
interest on future economic damage awards had been allowed, but
future damages were not reduced to present value.78  The 1986 Tort
Reform Act required their reduction to present value.79  In Navis-
tar, the appellant contended that allowing Pleasant to recover
prejudgment interest on both his past and future economic and
non-economic damages would amount to a “double recovery” for
Pleasant, since prejudgment interest was allowed only on the the-
ory that the plaintiff should be paid at the time of his injury, and
not at the (sometimes much later) time of the trial.80  In other
                                                                                                                                
rights because it changed the amount of the potential liability of the tortfeasors.”
Id. at 725 (citing Slaughter, 638 F.2d at 644-45).
71. 850 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1993).
72. See id. at 630.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 631.
75. Id. at 632.
76. 887 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1994).
77. See id. at 958.
78. See id.
79. See id; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.040(b) (LEXIS 1998).
80. See Navistar, 887 P.2d at 958-59.
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words, the interest made up for the money that the plaintiff lost by
waiting until the time of the trial to receive the money due him at
the time of his injury.  But, Navistar argued, there was no rationale
for awarding prejudgment interest on future damages, since these
damages were not due the plaintiff at the time between his injury
and the trial.81  The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, on the grounds
that “it is . . . a double recovery to permit prejudgment interest on
future sums which are discounted only to the time of the trial, for
such sums are greater than they would be if they were discounted
to the time of injury.”82  Only if future damages were discounted to
the time of the injury would it make sense to allow prejudgment
interest, for then the “interaction of the discount rate and the in-
tervening period” would prevent double recovery.83
The court later refused to extend this holding in McConkey v.
Hart,84 because it reasoned that the Alaska state legislature,
through the 1986 Tort Reform Act, had assumed that past and pre-
sent damages would be decided using the time of the trial, and not
the time of the injury, as a “reference point.”85  It still concluded
that the tort victim could not recover prejudgment interest on fu-
ture damages, but this time on the ground that the statute made
clear that the victim was not due the future damages until after the
trial.86  Thus, all the court’s dealings with the 1986 Tort Reform
Act made it clear that the only controversial parts of the Act were
in the details.  Alaska had switched to several liability by March 5,
1989.  All the 1997 Tort Reform Act would do is continue the min-
ute adjustments begun by the Alaska Supreme Court after the pas-
sage of the 1986 Act.
B. 1986 Damages Caps
Finally in 1986, in a move similar to those of many other state
legislatures, the Alaska Legislature also included in its Tort Re-
form Act a limit on the amount of non-economic damages a plain-
tiff could recover for an injury based upon negligence.87  In the first
section of the Act, the Alaska Legislature limited those damages to
$500,000.88  These caps were controversial then, as they are now,
but the years in between the passage of the 1986 and 1997 Acts
81. See id. at 959.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 960.
84. 930 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1996).
85. Id. at 406.
86. See id.
87. See Mahoney, supra note 9, at 68.
88. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (c) (Michie 1996) (prior to
amendment)).
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have demonstrated that the controversy is largely unfounded, as
tort verdicts rarely would be affected by these caps.  By 1997,
Alaskans were faced with a liability allocation system that already
had been amended, and a tort system that rarely awarded large
punitive damages to plaintiffs.  The 1997 Tort Reform Act that ul-
timately was enacted would make few real changes to the tort sys-
tem, and would not live up to the controversy it created.
IV.  THE 1997 TORT REFORM ACT
A. The Storm Before the Calm
The battle over the 1997 Tort Reform Act’s passage was pro-
longed, and it was passionate.  At times, it took on the characteris-
tics of a mudslinging political campaign.  Anti-reform groups
placed advertisements starring an eight-year old girl named “Sara”
who, although uninjured, had been strapped to a wheelchair in
support of the claim that girls like her “would never get [their] day
in court” if the Tort Reform bill became law.89  The conflict also at
times turned physical – Steve Conn, Executive Director of the
Alaska Public Interest Research Group and a tort reform oppo-
nent, and Frank Dillon, Executive Director of the Alaska Trucking
Association and a supporter of tort reform, came to blows during a
legislative hearing on the bill.90
The bill’s vetoed predecessor was denounced by the Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America as one of the contemporary
“attacks on the [tort] system at the state level.”91  Its passage in
1997 was lauded by the Risk Management Society as a “grand
slam” in its section on state legislation entitled, appropriately
enough, “Sometimes You Win.”92  Reform opponents argued that
the 1997 Tort Reform Act would deny tort victims their fair day in
court and block the full recovery of their damages.93  Business and
industry described it as providing a “reasonably predictable envi-
89. See Natalie Phillips, Critics “Appalled” By Group’s Tort-Reform Ad,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 17, 1997, at B1 (describing adverse reaction to
advertisement placed by the Alaska Action Trust, a group of trial lawyers op-
posed to the passage of the tort reform bill).
90. See Natalie Phillips, Tort Reform Hearing Degenerates Into Fisticuffs,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 1997, at A1 (“The ongoing tussle over efforts
to rewrite Alaska’s laws regarding injury lawsuits degenerated into some kind of
physical combat at a legislative hearing in Anchorage on Monday.”).
91. Our Next 50 Years, TRIAL (Association of Trial Lawyers of America /
President’s Page, Boston), Sept. 1, 1996, at 1.
92. Anne B. Allen, Statehouse Scoreboard: Legislative Wins, Losses, and De-
lays, RISK MGMT., Aug. 1, 1997, at 58.
93. See Phillips, supra note 6, at B1.
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ronment,” where Alaska businesses and insurance companies
might operate in peace.94
Governor Knowles fought “intense pressure from business in-
terests,” and vetoed the first proposed tort reform bill, passed by
the Republican legislature in 1996.95  It had taken tort reform spon-
sor Brian Porter four years to push the bill through the legisla-
ture.96  The vetoed bill capped punitive damages at $300,000, or
three times the amount of the compensatory damages, whichever
was greater, and awarded seventy-five percent of any punitive
damage award to the state’s general fund.97  Native American,
commercial fishing and environmental groups all fought to kill the
bill, partially on the ground that it would disturb the Exxon Valdez
settlement.98  Trial lawyers and “victim’s rights advocates” also
fought the bill, as they argued it would deny some tort victims a
full recovery of their damages.  One tort reform opponent, former
Alaska State Attorney General Charlie Cole, said the vetoed bill
should be called the “wrongdoer’s civil relief act,” since it absolved
big businesses and insurance companies from their duties to make
tort victims whole.99  After the bill was defeated, the Alaska State
Chamber of Commerce vowed to start gathering signatures to
place a tort reform initiative on the 1998 ballot.100
In response to the controversy over the vetoed bill, Governor
Knowles convened a Task Force on Civil Justice Reform, which
conducted a study of the Alaska tort system. The Task Force was
composed of business and industry leaders, trial lawyers, and civic
organization representatives.101  The group conducted a “thorough
study . . . of Alaska’s civil liability system,” held numerous public
hearings and presented a report detailing its findings to Governor
Knowles in December 1996.102  According to Governor Knowles,
“[t]he task force proposals [were] designed to decrease the costs of
94. See Clark, supra note 5,  at B1 (quoting Governor Knowles).
95. See Ralph Thomas, “Extreme” Tort Reform Draws Veto, Knowles Call Bill
“Flawed”; GOP Promises to Try Again, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 15, 1996,
at A1.
96. See Ralph Thomas, Tort Reform Resurges, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 20, 1997, at B1.
97. See Liz Ruskin, Top Lawyers Buck Tort Bill, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
May 30, 1996, at A1.
98. See Thomas, supra note 95, at B1.
99. See Ruskin, supra note 97, at A1.
100. See Thomas, supra note 95, at A1.
101. See Opinion: Lawyer Litigants, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 9, 1998,
at B7.
102. Talking Points for the Week (Dec. 9, 1996) <http://www.gov.state.ak.us/
talkingpts/talk1209.htm> (describing the Advisory Task Force on Civil Justice
Reform as “business-dominated”).
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resolving cases, discourage frivolous litigation, promote fair com-
pensation for injured parties and promote the predictability of out-
comes.”103  Some recommendations from this task force eventually
were incorporated into the bill that became law in August 1997.104
The arguments both for and against the 1997 bill’s passage
were heated and intense.  The groups fighting over the new bill
simply restated the same positions that had been taken years ago,
both in Alaska and across the country.105  Those businesses and in-
dustries supporting the bill’s passage argued that it would make
Alaska’s business environment much more secure, because busi-
nesses no longer would have to operate in fear of potentially dev-
astating damage awards entered against them.  Opponents of the
bill, mostly trial lawyer groups and coalitions with a direct stake in
seeing large jury awards continue, argued that the new bill was
special interest legislation whose sole purpose was to erode the
rights of Alaska tort victims by offering unethical blocks against
the recovery of damages to which victims might be entitled. As one
commentator has noted:
The kind of reform that occurs in our legislatures with respect to
tort law is usually the result of a funny kind of alliance between
two types of repeat players: the plaintiffs’ lawyers, on one side,
and the categories that give rise to defendants in tort law – the
injurer categories – on the other.  They both have certain inter-
ests. . . .  Potential defendants primarily seek to reduce their ex-
posure to lawsuits and damages. . . .  The plaintiffs’ lawyers, on
the other hand, are interested in something that will give rise to
large amounts of damages every once in a while.106
B. After the Battle
According to the “Legislative Intent” section of the 1997 Tort
Reform Act, the purpose of the new bill is to do the following:
103. Talking Points for the Week (Dec. 23, 1996) <http://www.gov.state.ak.us/
talkingpts/talk1223.htm>.
104. See Natalie Phillips, Task Force Recommends Cap on Punitive Damage
Awards, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 10, 1996, at B1; Natalie Phillips, Tort
Reform Battle Heats Up in Juneau: Both Sides Appeal to Human Element,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1997, at B1.
105. There is surely also a political element to this fight.  In the recent Florida
tort reform battle, the tort reformers were nearly all Republicans, while those
fighting tort reform were nearly all Democrats.  See Shuchman, supra note 20, at
550 n.1; see also John Lindauer, Lindauer: I Stand Apart From My Opponents,
Voice of the Times, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 19, 1998, at B7 (“I stand
apart from my opponents.  For example, Senator Taylor and Mr. Ross both are
lawyers opposed to tort reform, and advocate policies that are hostile to rural
Alaska.”).
106. See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 13, at 863-64 (footnote omitted).
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(1)  encourage the efficiency of the civil justice system by dis-
couraging frivolous litigation and by decreasing the amount,
cost, and complexity of litigation without diminishing the protec-
tion of innocent Alaskans’ rights to reasonable, but not exces-
sive, compensation for tortious injuries caused by others;
. . .
(3)  encourage individual savings and economic growth by fos-
tering an environment likely to control the increase of liability
insurance rates to individuals and businesses resulting in a sav-
ings to the state, municipalities, and private businesses that are
self-insured;
(4)  encourage the traditionally recognized Alaska values of self-
reliance and independence by underscoring the need for per-
sonal responsibility in making choices and personal accountabil-
ity for the consequences of those choices;
(5)  alleviate the high cost of malpractice insurance premiums
that discourage physicians, architects, engineers, attorneys, and
other professionals from rendering needed services to the pub-
lic. . . .107
Consistent with earlier tort reform trends in both Alaska and
the nation, the 1997 Tort Reform Act further changed Alaska’s
previous reforms of the joint and several liability system, and
added additional caps to the amount of non-economic damages
that Alaska tort victims may recover.  It also changed the statute of
repose in Alaska.  Yet the changes to the damages apportionment
mostly were cosmetic, as Alaska’s real shift from a joint and sev-
eral liability system to a system of pure several liability took place
in the years following the passage of the first Tort Reform Act in
1986.  Similarly, the damage caps incorporated in the 1997 Tort
Reform Act will have little effect on Alaska tort law, for cases
rarely arise in Alaska where the caps would effect the amount of
damages awarded.
C. Tinkering With Several Liability
Though most changes to Alaska’s liability allocation system
evolved in the 1980s, the 1997 Tort Reform Act modified the ex-
isting Alaska damages apportionment scheme in a couple of ways
that help continue Alaska’s move toward a system of several li-
ability.108  The 1997 Act made changes to the damages allocation
107. 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 26 § 1.
108. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (LEXIS 1998), as amended in 1997, reads as
follows:
Apportionment of damages
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one person, including
third-party defendants and persons who have settled or otherwise been
released, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct
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scheme that tightened Alaska’s embrace of the several liability
principles approved by the ballot initiative of 1987.109  Most impor-
tantly, the 1997 Tort Reform Act amended the 1986 Act to dictate
that the court make findings indicating “the percentage of the total
fault that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party de-
fendant, person who has been released from liability, or other per-
son responsible for the damages.”110  This had the effect of deleting
the distinction that had existed in the legislation between
“persons” and “parties,” so that juries would no longer be re-
strained from finding that a non-party litigant was at fault.
When the scope of Alaska’s 1986 transformations to the joint
and several liability system are considered, the small size of the
1997 transformations becomes apparent.  These are not sweeping
changes to Alaska tort law.  They are minor modifications to a
                                                                                                                                
the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall
make findings, indicating
(1) the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to re-
cover if contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault that is allocated to each claimant,
defendant, third-party defendant, person who has been released from li-
ability, or other person responsible for the damages unless the person
was identified as a potentially responsible person, the person is not a
person protected from a civil action under AS 09.10.055, and the parties
had a sufficient opportunity to join that person in the action but chose
not to; in this paragraph, “sufficient opportunity to join” means the per-
son is
(A) within the jurisdiction of the court;
(B) not precluded from being joined by law or court rule; and
(C) reasonably locatable.
(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall con-
sider both the nature of the conduct of each person at fault, and the ex-
tent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages
claimed.
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in
accordance with the findings and enter judgment against each party li-
able.  The court also shall determine and state in the judgment each
party’s equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance
with the respective percentages of fault  as determined under (a) of this
section.  Except as provided under AS 23.30.015 (g), an assessment of a
percentage of fault against a person who is not a party may only be used
as a measure for accurately determining the percentages of fault of a
named party.  Assessment of a percentage of fault against a person who
is not a party does not subject that person to civil liability in that action
and may not be used as evidence of civil liability in another action.
(d) The court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis
of several liability in accordance with that party’s percentage of fault . . . .
109. See id.
110. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(a)(2) (LEXIS 1998).
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doctrine of several liability whose existence was not in question be-
fore this legislation was passed.111
1.   Benner v. Wichman.  The Alaska State Legislature
amended the bill to make it possible for factfinders to assign fault
to a non-litigant.  It modified the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding
in Benner v. Wichman112 to ensure this result.113  As the bill states,
[i]n enacting this bill, it is the intent of this legislature as a matter
of public policy to . . .
(8)  ensure that in actions involving the fault of more than 
one person, the fault of each claimant, defendant, third-party
defendant, person who has been released from liability, or other
person responsible for the damages and available as a litigant be
determined and awards be allocated in accordance with the fault
of each, thereby modifying Benner v. Wichman . . . .114
In Benner, the plaintiff was a crane operator who worked on a
construction job with the defendant, a backhoe operator.115  Wich-
man was injured while working and subsequently sued Benner.116
He argued that Benner’s negligence was a cause of his injuries.117
Benner counterclaimed for summary judgment, arguing that the
court should consider the negligence of non-parties to the litigation
in Wichman’s suit.118  Benner contended that the jury should
“apportion liability among anyone responsible, including those not
party to the action.”119  Benner based his argument on the Tort Re-
111. This phenomenon of state “‘tort reform’ bills aimed like rifle shots at
smaller, specific issues” is not unique to Alaska.  See Kenneth D. Kranz, Tort Re-
form 1997-98: Profits v. People?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 161, 161-62 (Winter
1998).  As Kranz notes in his discussion of tort reform efforts in Florida, “[t]hese
bills typically reduce or eliminate liability in a particular circumstances that has
been the subject of a particular court decision.”  Id. at 162.
112. 874 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1994).
113. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(c) (LEXIS 1998) (making it possible to as-
sess fault against a person not a party, while not subjecting that person to civil li-
ability).
114. Id. § 1(8).
115. See Benner, 874 P.2d at 950-51.
116. See id. at 951.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 955.  The proposed jury instruction read:
Under Alaska law, a party is only responsible for the portion of damages
[equal] to that party’s percentage of fault.
The defendants claim that the plaintiff’s harm resulted, in whole or
in part, from the plaintiff’s own negligence and/or the negligence of oth-
ers, not parties to this litigation such as BC Excavating and Statewide
Petroleum.
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form Ballot Initiative passed in 1988.120  As discussed above, this
initiative amended Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080(d) to read,
“[t]he court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the
basis of several liability in accordance with that party’s percentage
of fault.”121  Benner acknowledged that he could have joined the
parties and made them part of the litigation, but he argued that the
statute made joinder unnecessary.122
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized that the “resolution of
[the] issue turn[ed] on the interpretation of ‘party,’ within the
meaning of AS 09.17.080(d).”123  It first noted that defendants in
Alaska still had an avenue for joining other potentially liable de-
fendants, namely that of equitable apportionment, and disap-
proved of several Alaska court cases that held that Alaska defen-
dants “can not bring in persons who share in the responsibility for
the injury.”124  It also considered a Florida Supreme Court decision
that had interpreted its own comparative fault provision as allow-
ing a jury to apportion damages among parties who were party to
the litigation, and not only to the accident.125  The Alaska court dis-
tinguished that statute from the case before it by reasoning that the
Florida statute being interpreted did not define the term “party”.126
                                                                                                                                
In order to assess fault to the plaintiff and/or others, you must de-
cide that it is more likely true than not true:
1.  that the plaintiff and/or others were negligent, and
2.  that such negligence was a legal cause of plaintiff’s harm.
Id. at 951 n.2.
120. See id. at 955.
121. Id; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (LEXIS 1998).
122. See Benner, 874 P.2d at 955.
123. Id. at 956.
124. See id. at 956 (quoting Owens v. Robbins, No. 1SI-90-354 Ci., 1, 2-3
(Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991)).  The Owens court had written that an Alaska
“deep pocket” defendant might still be liable for one hundred percent of a plain-
tiff’s damages, even if defendant’s  percentage of fault were very small, since
“contribution no longer exists and since the Supreme Court has rejected equitable
indemnity.” Owens, No. 151-90-354 Ci., at 2-3. The district court had voiced a
similar opinion, based on its prediction that the Alaska Supreme Court would not
adopt equitable indemnity in the face of the ballot initiative.  See Carriere v.
Cominco Alaska, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 680, 688 (D. Alaska 1993) (“[Allowing equi-
table indemnity as a means of joining defendants] presumes that the Alaska Su-
preme Court would in substance veto the 1987 initiative.  It supposes that the
court can construct an implied cause of action for indemnity even though the vot-
ers had eliminated a tortfeasor’s ability to hold another tortfeasor responsible
through the repeal of the statutory provision for contribution.”).
125. See Benner, 874 P.2d at 956.
126. See id.; see also Fabre v. Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).  The Florida
Supreme Court had been construing its comparative fault law, which read in rele-
vant part: “Apportionment of damages.  In cases to which this section applies, the
court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party’s
STIDVENT.CONVERT 05/07/99  11:21 AM
84 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:1
The Alaska statute, in contrast, defined “party” as a “party to the
action, including third-party defendants and persons who have
been released under AS 19.16.040.”127  Since “party” was defined in
the statute, the court ruled that the definition applied to the entire
statute.128  Thus, “party” could only mean “party to the action,”
and the statute could not be read to allow the jury to assign a per-
centage of fault to parties who were causes of the accident, but
who had not been joined by the litigants to the lawsuit.129
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080 was based in large part on
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, except that the ballot initia-
tive amended its liability apportionment scheme from modified
joint and several to several liability.130  The Comment to the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act considered a situation identical to the
one presented in this case:
The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other per-
sons who may have been at fault with regard to the particular
injury but who have not been joined as parties.  This is a deliber-
ate decision.  It cannot be told with certainty whether that per-
son was actually at fault or what amount of fault should be at-
tributed to him, or whether he will ever be sued, or whether the
statute of limitations will have run on him, etc. . . .  Both plaintiff
and defendants will have significant incentive for joining avail-
able defendants who may be liable.131
                                                                                                                                
percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity.”  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West 1993).  The Fabre court wrote:
By its clear terms, judgment should be entered against each party liable
on the basis of that party’s percentage of fault . . . .  Clearly, the only
means of determining a party’s percentage of fault is to compare that
party’s percentage to all of the other entities who contributed to the ac-
cident, regardless of whether they have been or could have been joined
as defendants.
623 So.2d at 1185.
127. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(a) (Michie 1996).  Alaska Statutes section
09.16.040 had been repealed by the initiative at the time this case was decided,
but the court here noted that “[r]epealed statutes relating to the same subject
matter may be in pari materia . . . and therefore may be construed together.”
Benner, 874 P.2d at 957 n.18 (citation omitted).  “Party” is also used in Alaska
Statutes section § 09.17.080(a)(2), which states that “the percentage of the total
fault of all of the parties to each claim is allocated to each claimant, defendant,
third-party defendant, and person who has been released from liability under §
09.16.040.”  See Benner, 874 P.2d at 955 n.15.
128. See Benner,  874 P.2d at 958.  As the court noted, “it is a general principle
of statutory construction that ‘the same words used twice in the same act have the
same meaning.’”  Id. at 957 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, SUTHERLAND’S
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992)).
129. See Benner, 874 P.2d at 957-58.
130. See id. at 958 n.19.
131. Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1993).
STIDVENT.CONVERT 05/07/99  11:21 AM
1999] TORT REFORM IN ALASKA 85
While the Comment envisions both parties making sure to join all
necessary parties, the real result of an inability to assign fault to
non-litigants is to add pressure to the defendant to join all poten-
tial defendants.  If the defendant does not, he or she might be held
responsible for that portion of the plaintiff’s injury caused by an
unjoined party.
The 1997 Tort Reform Act modified Benner and Alaska Stat-
utes section 09.17.080(a), and in so doing shifted the burden.  Un-
der the Act, the jury may allocate fault to any person, even if they
are not a party to the litigation, “unless that person was identified
as a potentially responsible person . . . and the parties had a suffi-
cient opportunity to join that person in the action but chose not
to.”132  The new statute goes on to define “sufficient opportunity to
join” as when “the person is . . . within the jurisdiction of the court;
. . . not precluded from being joined by law or court rule; and . . .
reasonably locatable.”133  This new rule forecloses the possibility
that defendants will have to pay for damages they did not cause,
but leaves open the slight possibility that a tort victim may win a
case and not adequately be compensated for his or her injuries.
Predictably, this new rule has met with some anger from tort
reform opponents.  In a complaint filed in 1998 challenging the
constitutionality of this legislation, the plaintiff in Evans v.
Alaska134 described the effect of the legislature’s overruling this
case as:
The legislation, if given effect, establishes that fault may be allo-
cated to persons who were not actually parties to a legal action
which significantly compromises Plaintiffs’ rights to be made
whole.  Plaintiffs’ rights to fair and just compensation and the
equal protection and due process of law is significantly diluted
and compromised if in fact fault may be allocated to a non-
party.135
Yet, it is unlikely that tort victims will be left holding the empty
bag of an unenforceable judgment against a tortfeasor whom they
132. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(a)(2) (LEXIS 1998) (as amended in 1997).
133. Id. § 09.17.080(a)(2)(A)-(C).
134. No. 4BE-98-32 Civil (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 1998).
135. Id. at 4.  In early 1998, this lawsuit was brought in Alaska superior court
contesting the constitutionality of the 1997 Tort Reform Act. This lawsuit was
filed on behalf of David “Buddy” Kutch Jr., a 16-year-old Bethel resident who
was rendered quadriplegic after a snowmobile accident in December 1997. Em-
boldened by a recent Illinois Supreme Court ruling overturning a 1995 tort-
reform law in that state, the group of trial attorneys challenging the law argued in
their filing in superior court that, among other things, the Act denied “certain ba-
sic and fundamental rights” and robbed tort victims of the “constitutional and
common law rights to fair, just and reasonable compensation for their injuries.”
Id. at 2, 3.
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did not join.  After all, in the event that a plaintiff fails to join a de-
fendant against whom a judgment is reached in a different pro-
ceeding, there is nothing stopping the plaintiff from then suing the
non-party tortfeasor.  Hence, this rule is necessary to complete
Alaska’s movement to a several liability system, but it will have lit-
tle impact on the rights of Alaska tort victims.  Tort victims with
the foresight to join all potentially liable parties easily can avoid
the pitfalls created by the Act’s overruling of Benner.
2.   Jackson v. Power.  The Tort Reform Act also explicitly
overruled the Alaska Supreme Court case Jackson v. Power.136  In
Jackson, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a hospital could be
liable for negligent health care provided by an emergency room
physician who acted as an independent contractor, and who was
not an employee of the hospital.137  The Jackson plaintiff had fallen
from a cliff and subsequently had been diagnosed by the physician
in the hospital’s emergency room.138  The physician did not detect
damage to the plaintiff’s kidneys, and because of this oversight, the
plaintiff lost both organs.139
While finding the plaintiff’s theory of hospital enterprise li-
ability unpersuasive, the court did agree with his contention that
the hospital might be held responsible for an independent contrac-
tor’s negligence under an “apparent authority” theory.140  Accord-
ing to the court, a principal grants “apparent authority” to another
person to act with regard to a third person when he “causes the
third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act
done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.”141  The
hospital, according to the court, gave Jackson reason to believe
that the emergency room doctor was the hospital’s agent, even
though the doctor was working as an independent contractor.142
The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly
136. 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).  The Evans plaintiff contended that, “[t]he
legislation neither offers nor presents any rational basis for the overruling of the
common law as set forth in Jackson v. Powers . . . and is contrary to Article IV,
Section 15 of the Constitution of Alaska which permits the legislature to change
only the rules of administration, practice and procedure.”  See Evans, No. 4BE-
98-32 Civil, at 6 (citation omitted).
137. See Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1377.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1381-82.
141. Id. at 1381 (quoting City of Delta Junction v. Mack Trucks, 670 P.2d 1128,
1130 (Alaska 1983)).
142. See id.
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had denied summary judgment on the issue of the physician’s ap-
parent authority to act on behalf of the hospital.143
More importantly, in Jackson the court ruled that the hospital,
as a matter of law, had a non-delegable duty to provide non-
negligent physician care in its emergency room.144  The plaintiff had
argued that public policy prevented a hospital emergency room
from protecting itself from liability by “shunting” the responsibility
to provide non-negligent care onto contracting physicians simply
because they were independent contractors and not employees.145
The court noted that the main characteristic of duties that made
them non-delegable was “that the responsibility is so important to
the community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer
it to another.”146  It reasoned that the numerous statutes governing
the management of hospitals
manifest the legislature’s recognition that it is the hospital as an
institution which bears ultimate responsibility for complying with
the mandates of the law.  It is the hospital that is required to en-
sure compliance with the regulations and thus, relevant to the in-
stant case, it is the hospital that bears final accountability for the
provision of physicians for emergency room care.  We, therefore,
hold that a general acute care hospital’s duty to provide physi-
cians for emergency room care is non-delegable.147
The 1997 Tort Reform Act added a new section to deal with
this case.148  The purpose of the new section was to “ensure that
hospitals that comply with the disclosure requirements set out in
this Act are not liable for the negligence of emergency room physi-
cians who are acting as independent contractors.”149  Essentially,
hospitals in Alaska have been given the right to delegate what the
Alaska Supreme Court has termed a “non-delegable duty.”150  The
new Alaska Statutes section absolves hospitals of liability for the
actions of their independent contractors when they “[provide] no-
tice that the emergency room physician is an independent contrac-
tor and the emergency room physician is insured as described un-
der (c) of this section.”151  This notice consists of a two-foot square
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1382.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 1383 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 512 (5th ed. 1984)).
147. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1384-85.
148. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096 (LEXIS 1998).
149. 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 26 § 1(6).
150. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 385.
151. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096 (LEXIS 1998).
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sign that must be “posted conspicuously in all admitting areas of
the hospital.”152
If nothing else, this section illustrates what big business has at
stake in tort reform litigation.  In this situation, Alaska hospitals
have avoided potentially damaging tort verdicts in a very fact spe-
cific situation.  There seems little other reason for inserting a pro-
vision like this into the 1997 Tort Reform Act.  Tort victims will
not benefit from the provision, and may even be harmed in some
circumstances.  It is doubtful that some emergency room patients
or those individuals accompanying them will have the time or the
ability to observe or understand the implications of such a sign.153
Many are unconscious when they arrive, most do not have a choice
of which emergency room to attend, and few would be in a position
to refuse to enter an emergency room when suffering a potentially
life-threatening injury because they read a sign informing them
that the hospital might not be liable for the negligence of some of
the physicians there.154
Similarly, the 1997 Tort Reform Act’s insurance requirement
mandates that an emergency room physician have liability insur-
ance amounting to at least $500,000 per incident and “$1,500,000
for all incidents in a year.”155  It is unclear how these two numbers
are supposed to operate in conjunction with one another.  The in-
surance floor on the yearly number of incidents might conceivably
serve as a liability ceiling for parties injured by emergency room
physicians working for hospitals as independent contractors.  A pa-
tient injured by a negligent independent contractor emergency
room physician might have no recourse but to sue the physician.  If
that patient happened to come along in December, and the physi-
cian has had a bad year, somebody like Jackson might be left with
no kidneys and no money to show for it.
No matter how these numbers work together, several factors
must combine before the tort victim might be left with unrecover-
able damages.  Specifically, a patient must be injured by an inde-
pendent contractor in a hospital emergency room and also have
injuries so great that they exceed the doctor’s required insurance
152. Id.
153. For instance, in Jackson v. Powers, the plaintiff had suffered “multiple
lacerations and abrasions of [his] face and scalp, multiple contusions and lacera-
tions of the lumbar area, several broken vertebrae and gastric distension . . . .”
743 P.2d at 1377.  At his deposition, he testified that “he recalled being placed  in
the helicopter, but had no recollection of being removed from it, being taken to
FMH, or of meeting the doctor who treated him.”  Id. at 1381 n.9.
154. See id. at 1381-82 (“Neither Jackson nor his mother selected FMH as the
place of treatment nor Dr. Power as Jackson’s physician.”).
155. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096(c) (LEXIS 1998).
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coverage of $500,000 per incident.156  Like the other 1997 Act
changes to the Alaska damages allocation system, this modification
affects only one fact-specific situation.  It transfers liability for
negligent emergency room care in some situations from the hospi-
tal to the independent contractor emergency room physicians it
employs.  While this could lead to circumstances in which the in-
jured patient cannot recover fully, as when the physician’s liability
insurance does not extend as deeply as the hospital’s might have,
the patient is not left to suffer without any hope of compensation.
It is an extremely unlucky tort victim who finds herself injured by
the string of circumstances contemplated by this section.  The tort
victim who will be unable to recover anything in these circum-
stances likely does not exist.
3.   Lake v. Construction Machinery, Inc.  While tinkering
with the state’s several liability provisions, the legislature also
overruled Lake v. Construction Machinery, Inc.,157 the Alaska
Supreme Court case that had applied the pre-ballot initiative
version of Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080 to a case involving an
injured worker’s suit against several defendants.158  In Lake, the
plaintiff suffered an injury in the scope of his employment after
falling fifty feet from a manlift.159  He sued several defendants,
including the manufacturer, the distributor and several
intermediate vendors of the manlift.160  The distributor, in a partial
affirmative defense, claimed that the plaintiff’s damages had to be
determined “among all parties allegedly responsible for Lake’s
injury, including the employer.”161
The plaintiff moved to strike this defense on the ground that
the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act contained an exclusive li-
ability provision that precluded third parties from asserting contri-
bution claims against the employer.162  The Alaska Workers’ Com-
pensation Act provided that
[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in AS 23.30.045 is exclu-
sive and in place of all other liability of the employer and any
fellow employee to the employee . . . and anyone otherwise enti-
tled to recover damages from the employer or fellow employee
at law or in admiralty on account of the injury or death.163
156. See id.
157. 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990).
158. See id. at 1028.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (LEXIS 1998).
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In other words, an employee who had collected workers’ compen-
sation benefits could then sue third parties for damages and re-
cover without the third parties having the benefit of factoring the
employer’s proportion of fault into their allocation of damages,
“even if the employer’s negligence was a proximate cause of the
employee’s injury.”164  The distributor responded that the purpose
of the 1986 Act implementing several liability in Alaska would be
foiled if the jury were not allowed to consider the employer’s fault
when allocating liability among concurrent tortfeasors.165
The court began its analysis by presuming that the legislature
that had enacted the 1986 Act had contemplated the Workers’
Compensation Act.166  It noted that while the legislature in Alaska
Statutes section 09.17.080(a)(2) had empowered the jury to allo-
cate fault among “each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant,
and person who has been released from liability under AS
09.16.040,” an employer did not really come under any of these
various classifications.167  It concluded that the legislature’s failure
to amend the Workers’ Compensation Act when it amended
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080(a)(2) indicated that it was satis-
fied with the first Act’s exclusive liability and employer reim-
bursement provisions.168  So an employer’s liability was relevant
only when a third party tortfeasor sought to prove the employer
was entirely at fault, or that the employer’s actions were a super-
seding cause of the tort victim’s injury.169  The court recognized
that this might be unjust for third-party defendants who could use
the employer’s fault as cause for reducing their proportion of re-
sponsibility for damages, but remained
unpersuaded that we should alter these holdings in the case be-
fore us . . . .  For example, we have no knowledge of the financial
impact of deviating from the exclusive liability provision of the
workmen’s compensation statute.  That is a matter which could
be clarified by legislative hearings, a process not available to this
court . . . .  Decisions concerning such matters are typically a
legislative function.170
The Alaska Legislature responded to the court’s plea, and
reconciled yet another fact-specific situation with Alaska’s system
164. Lake, 787 P.2d at 1029 (citing State v. Wein Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719, 720
(Alaska 1980)).
165. See id. at 1030.
166. See id.
167. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. §  09.17.080 (Michie 1996) (prior to amend-
ment)).
168. See id. at 1030-31.
169. See id. at 1031.
170. Id. at 1029 (quoting State v. Wein Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719, 720 (Alaska
1980)).
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of several liability.  In order to “ensure that one of several tortfea-
sors is not held responsible for the negligence of an employer,”171
the Legislature altered Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080 to clarify
that all parties would be held severally liable and found responsi-
ble only for their actual proportionate share of the allocated dam-
ages.172  This amendment successfully smoothed the interaction of
the Workers’ Compensation Statute with Alaska’s several liability
principles.  It did not deny Alaska tort victims their fair day in
court, for they will still be paid for their injuries.  The amendment
affects only those who do the paying.
4.   Conclusion.  The changes brought by the 1997 Act make
sense, but they will not make a big difference.  They are not major
changes and are addressed to fact-specific situations that are
unlikely to occur with frequency in Alaska tort law.  A plaintiff
who joins all necessary parties will nearly always recover fully for
his or her damages in the type of situation envisioned in Benner.  It
is only the exceedingly unlucky and extraordinarily rare plaintiff
who would be affected by the legislature’s overruling of Jackson v.
Powers.  A Lake plaintiff will not lose any money; he or she will
just receive it from a different source.  Those who lament Alaska’s
move to a several liability system should not be too upset by the
passage of the 1997 Tort Reform Act.  It is only the latest of a
series of small steps in a journey the bulk of which was taken years
ago.
D. Capping Damages
1.   Punitive Damages Already Awarded Sparingly in Alaska.
More than anything else, the controversy over the punitive
damages caps in the 1997 Tort Reform Act illustrates the degree to
which the interests of those who debate Alaska tort reform are
divorced from the interests of actual Alaska tort victims.
Nationwide, punitive damages are hardly ever awarded in tort
cases, despite the fact that stories of outrageous and ridiculous
punitive damages awards often are used by tort reform advocates
to prove that the tort system has gotten out of control.173  Instead,
171. 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 26 § 1.
172. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (LEXIS 1998) (as amended in 1997).
173. See Fried, supra note 14, at 59 (“Additional research has quantified that
only 1.5% of personal injury awards contain any punitive damages.”); see also
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics
of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 71, 71-78 (1998)
(blaming the repeated attacks on the punitive damages system, in the face of sub-
stantial evidence that punitive damages infrequently are awarded, on the useful-
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the beliefs that punitive damages awards are “common, unduly
large, and capricious,” either in Alaska or in the United States as a
whole, are simply wrong.174
In Alaska, punitive damages serve a number of purposes, but
even prior to the 1997 Tort Reform Act, recovering them in an
Alaska tort case was no easy task.175  Traditionally, the Alaska Su-
preme Court has held that punitive damages are to be used “to
punish the wrongdoer and to deter the wrongdoer and others like
him from repeating the offensive act.”176  Whether or not punitive
damages are awarded depends on such factors as “the wrongdoer’s
motive, state of mind, and degree of culpability.”177  The Alaska
Supreme Court has ruled that punitive damages are to be used
sparingly, as they are a severe remedy whose frequent employment
does not find favor with the law.178  The court’s reluctance to award
punitive damages finds parallels in the Alaska legislation dealing
with such damages, even prior to the 1997 amendments.179  For in-
                                                                                                                                
ness of such emotional arguments to special interest groups engaged in reforming
the tort system to their own benefit).  The authors write that “[t]he task for the
reform partisans has been convincing policymakers, key elites including the me-
dia, and the public that punitive damages and the entire civil justice system have
changed so dramatically and with such negative consequences that fundamental
policy changes are needed.”  Id. at 77.  One author has characterized the view-
point that interest groups are able to promote tort reform in the face of a mass of
empirical data that illustrates their claims are embellished or distorted, as the
“jaundiced view.”  See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Leg-
ends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717-20 (Fall 1998).
Galanter describes the “jaundiced view” as comprised of a variety of “legal leg-
ends” and folklore.  See id. at 721-23.  These legends range from such “global
characterizations” as “the legal system ‘is no longer fair’” to such “atrocity sto-
ries” as the case of a woman who successfully (at least initially) litigated a medical
malpractice claim after a CAT scan allegedly robbed her of her psychic powers.
See id. at 726-29.
174. Andrea Moore Hawkins, Balancing Act: Public Policy and Punitive Dam-
ages Caps, 49 S.C. L. REV. 293, 300-01 (citing, among others, an American Bar
Foundation study finding that, out of 25,267 civil jury verdicts, punitive damages
were awarded in only 4.9% of the cases).
175. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
176. Id. at 209 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264,
1266 (Alaska 1992)).
177. Id. (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O’Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 774
(Alaska 1982)).
178. See id. at 210 (citing State Farm, 831 P.2d at 1266; Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Beadles, 731 P.2d 572, 574 (Alaska 1987)).
179. See Lee Houston & Assocs. Ltd. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 856 (Alaska
1991) (citing to the pre-amendment statute on punitive damages as support for its
holding that “the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant’s conduct was outrageous, such as acts done with malice, bad motive,
or reckless indifference to the interests of another”).
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stance, the court has cited to the pre-amendment language dictat-
ing that “[p]unitive damages may not be awarded in an action . . .
unless supported by clear and convincing evidence.”180
To justify his or her claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff in
an Alaskan tort case “must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant’s conduct was outrageous, such as acts done
with malice, bad motive, or reckless indifference to the interests of
another.”181  The Alaska Supreme Court also has held that a trial
court in Alaska need not even submit a punitive damages issue to a
jury if there is no evidence that would allow that jury to infer that
the defendant acted with actual malice in a case.182 The Alaska Su-
preme Court has upheld a trial court’s decision refusing to submit
a punitive damages issue to a jury in a case where the plaintiff had
sued her physician based on his report to her that she had the HIV
virus, which report later turned out to be a false positive.183  The
court decided that the defendant doctor’s action of seeking coun-
seling for the plaintiff after the false positive result illustrated a
concern for her well-being that was inconsistent with an award of
punitive damages.184
As an additional bar to a tort plaintiff’s recovering large
amounts of punitive damages, Alaskan courts have the ability to
review punitive damages for excessiveness on appeal.185  Courts
consider punitive damages excessive if they are “manifestly unrea-
sonable.”186  A court that finds a punitive damages award unrea-
180. See Chizmar, 896 P.2d at 210 (citing Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 856)
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (LEXIS 1998) (alteration in original)).
181. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 856 (citing Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929,
934 (Alaska 1986)).  While the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant
acted with actual malice, he or she must at least prove that the defendant acted
with “reckless indifference to the rights of others” and that the defendant’s con-
duct was “conscious action in deliberate disregard of [those rights].”  Chizmar,
896 P.2d at 210 (quoting State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 320 (Alaska 1984)
(alteration in original)).
182. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska
1992) (“Malice may be inferred if the acts exhibit ‘a callous disregard for the
rights of others.’” (quoting O’Kelley, 645 P.2d at 774)).
183. See Chizmar, 896 P.2d at 210-11.
184. See id. at 210; see also Wien Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 631
(Alaska 1986) (finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant
was indifferent to the consequences of his actions when defendant attempted to
remedy the consequences of the act).
185. See, e.g., Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, Nos. S-6390, S-6420, 1998 WL 909909,
at *17 (Alaska Dec. 31, 1998).
186. See, e.g., Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 949 (Alaska 1986)
(citing American Nat’l Watermattress v. Manville, 642 P.2d 1330, 1340 (Alaska
1982)).
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sonable will vacate a jury’s award and order a remittitur, whose
amount will be the maximum amount that the jury might have
awarded that would not be considered excessive.187  Factors that go
to whether or not a punitive damages award is excessive include
“the compensatory damage amount, magnitude of the offense, im-
portance of the policy violated, and the defendant’s wealth.”188
These factors are similar to those involved in the federal test.189
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for ex-
ample, remanded an Alaska case in which the ratio of punitive-to-
compensatory damages awarded at the lower level was 130 to 1.190
187. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733, 742 (Alaska 1984)
(“[M]aximum possible recovery approach is more appropriate in a remittitur con-
text, because it comes closer to approximating the decision made by the jury.”).
188. Alaskan Village, 720 P.2d at 949.  The Court also has remarked that there
exists no exact ratio between the amount of compensatory damages and the
amount of punitive damages awarded, and that a high ratio may be indicative, but
not dispositive, of a punitive damage award’s excessiveness.  See Norcon, 1998
WL 909909, at *17.  In approving a case in which the punitive damages award was
seventy times that of the compensatory damages, the court wrote that it has:
refused to prescribe a definite ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages.  Though comparing punitive and actual damage awards is one
way to determine if punitive damages are excessive, other factors, such
as the magnitude and flagrancy of the offense, the importance of the
policy violated, and the defendant’s wealth, are equally important to the
determination.
Cameron v. Beard, 864 P.2d 538, 551 (Alaska 1993) (citations omitted); see also
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621, 624 n.3 (Alaska 1980) (noting that the
relationship between punitive and compensatory damages may be of slight value
or “totally inapplicable” depending on the individual case).
189. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-87 (1996) (identifying as
“guideposts” that must be considered: (1) “degree of reprehensibility of the de-
fendant’s conduct”; (2) “ratio [of punitive damage award] to the actual harm in-
flicted on the plaintiff”; and (3) “[c]omparing the punitive damages award and the
civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct”).
190. See Ace v. Aetna Life Ins., 139 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although
not dispositive itself, the ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages . . . is far be-
yond any approved by Alaska courts.”).
STIDVENT.CONVERT 05/07/99  11:21 AM
1999] TORT REFORM IN ALASKA 95
2.   1997 Caps.  The 1997 Tort Reform Act limits a tort
victim’s recovery for non-economic and punitive damages.
According to the “Legislative Intent” section of the bill, its
purpose with regard to these damage caps is to ensure that Alaska
law provides “reasonable, but not excessive, punitive damage
awards against tortfeasors sufficient to deter conduct and practices
that harm innocent Alaskans . . . and businesses resulting in a
savings to the state, municipalities, and private businesses that are
self-insured.”191
The bill attempts to do this by first limiting the types of dam-
ages for non-economic classes for which a tort victim may recover
to “compensation for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical im-
pairment, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consor-
tium, and other nonpecuniary damage.”192  It also caps the amount
of damages that a tort victim may recover at “$400,000 or the in-
jured person’s life expectancy in years multiplied by $8,000, which-
ever is greater.”193  Personal injury claim recoveries are limited to
the greater of $1 million or the person’s life expectancy in years
multiplied by $25,000 when the damages are awarded for severe
physical impairment or severe disfigurement.194  The Act describes
the following test for the awarding of punitive damages:
The fact finder may make an award of punitive damages only if
the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the de-
fendant’s conduct
(1)  was outrageous, including acts done with malice or
bad motives; or
(2)  evidenced reckless indifference to the interest of an-
other person.195
When determining how much punitive damages to award, the fact-
finder “may consider” such factors as
(1)  the likelihood at the time of the conduct that serious harm
would arise from the defendant’s conduct;
(2)  the degree of the defendant’s awareness of the likelihood
described in (1) of this subsection;
(3)  the amount of financial gain the defendant gained or ex-
pected to gain as a result of the defendant’s conduct;
(4)  the duration of the conduct and any intentional concealment
of the conduct;
(5)  the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of
the conduct;
191. 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 26, § 1(2) & § 1(3).
192. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(a) (LEXIS 1998).
193. Id. § 09.17.010(b).
194. See id. § 09.17.010(c).
195. Id. § 09.17.020(b).
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(6)  the financial condition of the defendant; and
(7)  the total deterrence of other damages and punishment im-
posed on the defendant as a result of the conduct, including
compensatory and punitive damages awards to persons in situa-
tions similar to those of the plaintiff and the severity of the
criminal penalties to which the defendant has been or may be
subjected.196
In what may be the most controversial provision, the Act limits the
amount of punitive damages that may be recovered in most cases
to either three times the amount of compensatory damages that
the plaintiff received or $500,000, whichever is greater.197  In addi-
tion, fifty percent of the plaintiff’s punitive damages award must be
deposited into the general fund of Alaska.198
3.   Alaska Damage Awards.  In December 1996, the
Governor’s Advisory Task Force on Civil Justice Reform issued a
report setting out some of the conclusions it had reached after
studying court system data regarding Alaska tort cases.199  A
number of the conclusions it presented support the argument that
the 1997 Tort Reform Act will have little effect on most tort
victims in Alaska.
The Task Force determined that there had been little change
in the number of personal injury cases filed in Alaska since 1988,
and that the 1993 Alaska rate of 159 tort lawsuits filed per 100,000
population placed the state near the low end of the twenty-eight
states studied by the National Center for State Courts in that
year.200  In fact, one expert testifying before the Task Force noted
that while automobile accident lawsuits had been growing at a rate
of about four percent in the rest of the country, the number of
automobile accident lawsuits in Alaska had remained steady at
around 825 a year.201  These findings seemed to undermine tort re-
form advocate claims that tort reform in Alaska was needed in or-
196. Id. § 09.17.020(b)(1)-(7).
197. See id. § 09.17.020(c)(1)-(2).  The jury may make greater awards if it de-
termines that the tortfeasor’s conduct was motivated by financial gain and that
the tortfeasor knew of the consequences of its conduct.  See id. § 09.17.020(g).  A
different cap system also is used in the case of “an action against an employer to
recover damages for an unlawful employment practice prohibited by [Alaska
Statutes section] 18.80.220.”  Id. § 09.17.020(h).
198. See id. § 09.17.020(j).
199. See generally OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S
ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, December 1996 (on file with
Alaska Law Review) (hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT).
200. See id. at 97.
201. See Natalie Phillips, Alaska Problems Ill-Defined, Tort Reform Task Force
Told, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 4, 1996, at B1.
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der to curtail a “litigation explosion” allegedly sweeping the state.
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, a Judicial Council
study of Alaska tort cases turned up few instances of tort awards
that would have been affected by the 1997 Tort Reform Act.  The
Task Force had requested that the Alaska Judicial Council202  con-
duct a study of jury awards and damages awards in Alaska tort
cases. The Judicial Council analyzed the 233 cases that it discov-
ered in the period of 1985 to 1995 that involved jury trials of tort
claims in Alaska.203  The Council analyzed the verdicts “in terms of
case type, parties to the case, plaintiff and defendant verdicts, li-
ability/outcomes, allocation of fault, damages, costs and fees, offers
of judgment, appeals, and length of case.”204
The Council found that, of the type of tort cases that typically
went to trial in Alaska, thirty-seven percent were automobile
cases, seventeen percent were premises liability cases, and thirteen
percent were medical malpractice cases.205  Of the cases that went
to trial, the plaintiffs were successful roughly half of the time.206
The defendants were generally more successful in premises liabil-
ity and medical malpractice cases, while the plaintiffs had greater
success in automobile and employment cases.207  When damages
were awarded in these cases, they most frequently were awarded
for past economic losses, such as lost wages and unpaid medical
bills.208  Non-economic damages comprised about one-third of the
awards, and the Judicial Council concluded that “juries seldom
made awards” for loss of consortium, loss of enjoyment of life, and
emotional distress.209  Punitive damages were awarded in only six
percent of the cases studied by the Council, even though they were
202. See id.  The Alaska Judicial Council “is an independent state agency es-
tablished by the Alaska Constitution in the judicial branch of state government.”
See Alaska Judicial Council Home Page (visited Feb. 12, 1999)
<http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/>.  Its duties include judicial selection, judicial evalua-
tion and retention, and research into the administration of justice.  See id.
203. See generally APPENDIX C: REPORT FROM ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL:
MEMORANDUM FROM SUSANNE DI PIETRO AND TERI CARNS TO THE GOVERNOR’S
TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 3 (Nov. 13, 1996) (on file with Alaska
Law Review) (hereinafter DI PIETRO and CARNS).
204. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 199, at 105.
205. See DI PIETRO and CARNS, supra note 203, at 3 (ranking the cases in de-
scending order of frequency as employment (7%, or 17 cases) general injury (7%,
or 17  cases), general property damage (7%, or 16 cases), intentional torts (5%, or
12 cases), product liability (3%, or 7 cases), insurance bad faith cases (about 1%),
and two common carrier cases (less than 1 %)).
206. See id. at 4.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 7.
209. See id. at 8.
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requested by the plaintiffs in twenty-seven percent of the cases.210
In addition, the damages awarded by juries were oftentimes rather
low.  For example, in fifty-eight percent of the superior court cases
studied by the Judicial Council, juries awarded damages of less
than the superior court’s jurisdictional limit of $50,000.211  Around
one-third of the jury verdicts were for less than $10,000.212  The
Council concluded that, “[o]verall, about 61% of all jury verdicts
awarded damages under $20,000.”213
The Judicial Council also analyzed Alaska tort jury verdicts in
each year from 1988 to 1996.  During these years, there were a to-
tal of seven jury verdicts for more than $1 million.214  The average
jury award in each of the 114 cases with plaintiff awards during
these years, excluding awards over $1 million, was $97,309.215
Alaska juries made some large awards in the tort cases studied, but
they were relatively few.  Six percent of the damage awards ex-
ceeded $500,000, and another nine percent of the awards were
from $100,000 to $500,000.216  Juries awarded punitive damages
seventeen times in fifteen of the 233 cases studied.217  Half of the
punitive damages awards were for under $60,000.218  Juries awarded
punitive damages in, among other things, four intentional tort
cases, two employment cases, two personal injury cases, one prop-
erty damage case, one insurance bad faith claim and one automo-
bile accident involving a drunken driver.219
While the parties appealed only one quarter of all the tort
cases studied, they appealed six of the fifteen cases involving puni-
tive damages.220  Courts reversed two of these six awards and the
parties settled the remaining four out of court.221  The largest puni-
tive damages award made was $25,300,000, but this judgment was
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See DI PIETRO and CARNS, supra note 203, at 8.
213. Id.
214. See id at 14.  It should be noted that the figures summed up in the table
are not indicative of any reductions to the awards made at the trial or appellate
level.  See id. at 14 n.1.
215. See id.  The average jury payout in all cases with plaintiff awards was
$576,642, but it should be noted that this average includes the $25 million verdict
but does not reflect its adjustment on appeal.
216. See DI PIETRO and CARNS, supra note 203, at 8.
217. See id. at  8-9.  In two of the cases, punitive damages were awarded in two
separate instances.  See id.
218. See id. at 9.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 11.
221. See id. at 9.
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settled for a different sum out of court on appeal.222  In total, there
were four punitive damages verdicts of greater than $250,000 in the
cases analyzed by the Judicial Council, and two of these verdicts
were affected on appeal.223  The Judicial Council summarized its
findings as follows:
When they made awards, juries tended to give less than the
amount requested in the complaint: the bulk of superior court
awards were less than $50,000.  In both superior and district
court verdicts, damages for economic losses were more common
than those for non-economic losses, and awards for future losses
of any kind were relatively rare.  Juries awarded punitive dam-
ages in only 15 of the 233 cases studied, and many of those
awards were less than $60,000.224
The Judicial Council’s findings for Alaska are consistent with a na-
tional study undertaken by the Department of Justice in 1995.225
The Department of Justice conducted a twelve-month study of ap-
proximately 762,000 state court civil cases in the nation’s seventy-
five most populous counties, and discovered that in the 12,000
cases decided by juries, the plaintiffs received punitive damages in
only six percent of the 6,200 cases that they had won.226  More tell-
ingly, a Department of Justice comparison of the mean and median
awards suggested that the awards are not evenly distributed, indi-
cating that “large awards, the ones that catch the media’s atten-
tion, are extremely rare compared to smaller awards.”227  It seems
true that, based on the results achieved by groups studying puni-
tive damages in both Alaska and the nation, “punitive damages are
really a trivial part of tort law.”228
The Judicial Council’s analysis indicates that there are few
cases whose awards likely would be affected by the 1997 Tort Re-
form Act in Alaska.  Punitive damages rarely are awarded in
Alaska tort cases, and those that are awarded are seldom large
enough to meet or exceed the damages caps put into place by the
1997 Tort Reform Act.  Indeed, since the Act was passed, few
cases have made reference to the damage caps put in place by the
Act.  Some cases have addressed the Act’s requirement that a
plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that the wrong-
doer’s conduct “was outrageous, such as acts done with malice or
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 13.
225. See Ackerman, supra note 39, at 336 (citing CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 13
(1995)).
226. See id. (citing DEFRANCES, supra note 225, at 1).
227. Id.
228. Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 13, at 861.
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bad motives or reckless indifference to the interests of another
person.”229  However, the 1997 Tort Reform Act did little to amend
this standard, established by the 1986 reforms, and so cannot be
blamed for any decisions refusing to award punitive damages be-
cause this standard was not met.230
For instance, in Albertson v. Sisters of Providence Hospital,
Inc.,231 the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court ruling that a plaintiff
fired for failure to seek treatment for his drug abuse problem could
not sue the defendant employer for employment discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.232  The court of appeals
also agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff could not sustain a
punitive damages action against the defendant, as he could not
“prove by clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant’s ac-
tions were outrageous, or characterized by any of the other lan-
guage in the statute dealing with the punitive damages require-
ments.233  The post-amendment standard applied in this case is
exactly the same as it was before: the “clear and convincing” stan-
dard must be met before punitive damages are awarded.
The Alaska Supreme Court also dealt with punitive damages
issues after the passage of the 1997 Tort Reform Act, in Veco, Inc.
v. Rosebrock.234  Like courts before it, the Alaska Supreme Court
acknowledged that punitive damages in Alaska “are disfavored
and are allowed only within narrow limits.”235  It then remanded a
trial court’s award of punitive damages because it was unable to
determine whether the court had awarded punitive damages based
on direct liability, or whether they had been awarded incorrectly
on a theory of vicarious liability.236  The court never reached the is-
sue of whether the punitive damages award would have had to be
229. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (LEXIS 1998).
230. See, e.g., Ace v. Aetna Life Ins., 139 F.3d 1241, 1246 n.14 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“The [Alaska Statues section 09.17.020] was amended in August 1997 to make
minor textual changes . . . .”).  The plaintiff in this case was forced to live in her
car for a period of time in 1993 after her insurance company unjustly refused to
pay for an operation on her right leg.  See id. at 1243; see also Liz Ruskin, Jury
Tells Insurer to Pay Up: Punitive Damages Total $16.5 Million, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, June 1, 1996, at A1.  The award later was reduced on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.  See Ace, 139 F.3d at 1248-49.
231. No. 97-35964, 1998 WL 560073 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1998).
232. See id. at *2.
233. Id. at *3 (citing Ace, 139 F.3d at 1246 (quoting ALASKA STAT. §
09.17.020(b)(1) (LEXIS 1998))).
234. Nos. S-7080, S-7120, 1998 WL 881190 (Alaska Dec. 18, 1998).
235. Id. at *16.
236. See id. at *17.  Punitive damages may not be awarded in Alaska based on
vicarious liability for acts of employees outside the scope of their employment.
See id. at *16.
STIDVENT.CONVERT 05/07/99  11:21 AM
1999] TORT REFORM IN ALASKA 101
remitted because of the Tort Reform Act.  Had the plaintiff’s $1.5
million punitive damages award been properly awarded in the first
place, it would have been reduced.237  However, the supreme
court’s remand indicates how rarely punitive damage awards sur-
vive the appeals process in Alaska intact, and thus emphasizes how
little effect the 1997 Tort Reform Act will have on punitive dam-
ages in Alaska.
E. A New Statute of Repose – Meeting the Challenge of
the Turner Court
The 1997 Tort Reform Act also addressed the Alaska Su-
preme Court’s decision in Turner Construction Co. v. Scales.238  In
Turner, the court had found Alaska’s six-year statute of repose on
suits against design professionals unconstitutional on the ground
that it violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitu-
tion.239  The 1997 Tort Reform Act rewrote the statute of repose to
deal with the Alaska Supreme Court’s concerns.240
In Turner, two plaintiffs had sued the construction company
that built their apartment building after plaintiffs were injured in
unrelated incidents involving a defective fireplace and a faulty ga-
rage door opener.241  In both cases, the defendants claimed that the
plaintiffs’ causes of action were barred by the six-year statute of
repose dealing with actions against design professionals.242  The
statute the defendants relied on provided in part that
(a)  No action, whether in contract . . . in tort or otherwise, to re-
cover damages (1) for a deficiency in the design, planning, su-
pervision or observation of construction of an improvement to
real property; (2) for injury to property, real or personal, arising
out of a deficiency; or (3) for injury to the person or for wrongful
death arising out of such deficiency, may be brought against a
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervi-
sion or observation of construction, or construction of an im-
237. See id. at *2.
238. 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988).  For a critique of the Alaska Supreme Court’s
decision in this case, see Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional
Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 209, 267-71 (1998).
239. See Turner, 752 P.2d at 472.
240. See 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 26, § 1(8) (describing the legislative intent of
part of the new Act as to “enact a statute of repose that meets the tests set out in
Turner”).
241. See Turner, 752 P.2d at 469.  The Alaska Supreme Court consolidated the
cases.
242. See id.  “Design professionals” include “architects, engineers, and contrac-
tors.”  Id.  A statute of repose differs from a statute of limitations in that “the
former may bar a cause of action before it accrues, because the statute begins to
run from a specific date unrelated to the date of injury.”  Id. at 469 n.2.
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provement more than six years after substantial completion of an
improvement.243
While the statute protected most design professionals from law-
suits, it expressly excluded from its jurisdiction such parties as
owners and tenants of the property.244  The plaintiffs first con-
tended, and the court agreed, that they had standing to challenge
the statute because the statute narrowed the group of potentially
liable parties from whom the plaintiffs might successfully seek re-
covery.245  The court then decided to apply a “fair and substantial
relationship” equal protection analysis to the statute, as the plain-
tiff’s right to seek recovery in courts, while not a fundamental con-
stitutional right, was a “significant one.”246
Applying this level of equal protection analysis, the court first
asked whether the statute had been a valid use of the government’s
legislative authority.247  It determined that it had been, since its de-
sign to “encourage construction and avoid stale claims by shielding
certain defendants from potential future liability” was a proper
state goal.248  The court then considered, as the last step in its
analysis, whether the statute substantially furthered this purpose.249
It concluded that it did not, since the statute treated owners and
tenants of the property differently than it did the design profes-
sionals whom it specifically protected.250  The court held that no
243. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (Michie 1996) (amended 1997) (quoted in
Turner, 752 P.2d at 469).  The court described this as a typical state statute passed
around that time as a result of the lobbying efforts of design professionals.  See
Turner,  752 P.2d at 470 n.6.
244. See Turner, 752 P.2d at 470 n.7 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055(d)
(Michie 1996) (amended 1997)).
245. See id. at 470.
246. Id. at 470-71.  If the plaintiff had asserted a fundamental constitutional
right, or if the statute had used a suspect classification, then the court would have
ruled the statute “unconstitutional under the federal standard absent a compel-
ling state interest.”  Id. at 470.
247. See id. at 471.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See id.  In Professor McGreal’s analysis:
The court never offered any factual or logical argument to dispute the
state’s reasons for the statute of repose.  Instead the court’s sole argu-
ment against the law was that the statute of repose might discourage
some construction.  Upon analysis, however, we see that the court offers
no facts in support of this argument, and the logic of the argument is
flawed . . . .  While the court correctly identified a possible increase in li-
ability of non-design professionals, the court drew the wrong conclusion
from that fact . . . .  [If lawsuits against design professionals do not in-
clude non-design professionals as joint tortfeasors] there will be cases
(perhaps significant in number) where the statute of repose can protect
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justification for this different treatment could support the result
that, in the case where an owner and a design professional were
both equally at fault for a plaintiff’s injuries, the owner would be
responsible for the entire damages since he had no right of contri-
bution against the protected design professional.251  The court con-
cluded that the statute of repose was unconstitutional, as “there is
no substantial relationship between exempting design profession-
als from liability, shifting liability for defective design and con-
struction to owners and materials suppliers, and the goal of en-
couraging construction.”252
The 1997 Tort Reform Act created a new statute of repose
that is not nearly as harsh as the one invalidated by the Turner
court.253  Most importantly, it does away with the distinction be-
tween design professionals and owners and tenants that existed in
the 1967 statute of repose.254  The new statute of repose extends the
plaintiff’s time for bringing an action to within ten years of either
“substantial completion of the construction” or the “last act al-
leged to have caused the personal injury, death, or property dam-
age.”255  The statute does not apply in such cases as intentional con-
cealment of defects, fraud, gross negligence, and breach of
warranty.256
This new statute of repose ensures that plaintiffs injured by
faulty construction will not be injured by Alaska’s several liability
system.  Before Turner, a plaintiff injured by shoddy handiwork in
an apartment building might have been left with unrecoverable
damages.  If the design professional were eighty percent at fault,
but protected by the statute of repose, then the plaintiff might
                                                                                                                                
design professionals from liability without a threat of harm to non-design
professionals.
McGreal, supra note 238, at 269-70.
251. See Turner, 752 P.2d at 471-72.  The court relied on its earlier holding that
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act had not abolished joint and
several liability in Alaska.  See id. at 471 (citing Arctic Structures v. Wedmore,
605 P.2d 426, 435 (Alaska 1979)); see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010-.060 (Michie
1996) (amended 1997).  Therefore, “the potential interest of joint tortfeasors in
obtaining contribution, in addition to the claimant’s interest in suing a particular
party, must be considered.”  Turner, 752 P.2d at 472.
252. Turner, 752 P.2d at 472.
253. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (LEXIS 1998).
254. See Turner, 752 P.2d at 470 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055(d)
(Michie 1996) (repealed 1997) (“The limitation prescribed by this section shall
not be asserted by way of defense by a person in actual possession or control, as
owner, tenant, or otherwise of an improvement at the time a deficiency in an im-
provement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is
proposed to bring an action.”))
255. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (LEXIS 1998).
256. See id. § 09.10.055(b).
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have recovered only twenty percent of his damages from the un-
protected owner or tenant of the apartment.  Under the new sys-
tem, a plaintiff who is able to recover anything at all will be able to
recover it from all potentially responsible parties, for the new stat-
ute eliminated the unconstitutional discrimination that the old
statute of repose imposed upon non-design professionals.  This
new statute of repose extends the time that plaintiffs have for re-
covery from six (or eight, in the case of non-design professionals)
to ten years, and ensures that all potentially responsible parties are
denied immunity during this time period.  It also protects the
plaintiff from most of the egregious violations, like fraud or inten-
tional concealment, that his apartment builders might commit.
Like the other changes in the 1997 Tort Reform Act, the new stat-
ute of repose will do little to harm injured plaintiffs.  And, by being
constitutional, it is actually an improvement over the older statute
of repose.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of the several liability and damages caps pro-
visions incorporated into the 1997 Tort Reform Act reveals that
potential tort victims were right not to become too involved in de-
bating the merits of its passage.  Those groups with the most at
stake in tort reform legislation were not the tort victims, but those
who stood to gain or lose the most depending on how the tort sys-
tem was altered, or “reformed.”  So it is not surprising that plain-
tiffs lawyers groups comprised a sizeable contingent of those op-
posing the bill’s passage, as they stood to gain the most from
retaining a tort system in which sizeable punitive and non-
economic damages were awarded, no matter how infrequently.
Neither is it surprising that the traditional defendants in these
types of cases, be it insurance companies or big businesses, would
fight to impose punitive damages caps and to ensure that the sev-
eral liability system originated in the 1986 tort reform legislation
would receive the legislative attention it needed to dissuade any
further instances of “deep pocket” defendants paying more than
their fair share of any tort recovery.
But it remains true that what “is usually missing from reform
proposals in legislatures, however, is the significant presence of
people who are looking specifically to the interests of those who
are injured and to the administrative costs of granting such people
recovery.”257  Tort victims are injured once, and it is only at the
time of their injuries that they care about the tort system.  Plain-
tiff’s lawyers and insurance companies, on the other hand, repeat-
257. Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 13, at 864.
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edly are implicated in the tort system, and they have the most in-
terest in seeing it changed, or not changed, for their benefit.  And
while the public may claim they have the interests of big business
or of tort victims at heart, the lack of involvement of average citi-
zens in the hotly contested tort reform battle in Alaska seems to
indicate that perhaps they only have convinced themselves “as we
all do, that what is good for them is also good for the plaintiffs and
the country.”258  But it seems that the average Alaska citizens may
know best, and express the most intelligent view on their interests
by refraining from much involvement in the tort reform debate.
The battle over tort reform will go on, in Alaska and elsewhere,
but it most likely will continue to be a battle between players
whose interests in the tort system are not the same as the interests
of tort victims themselves.  And thus, as many Alaskans may have
guessed already, for all its sound and fury, the tort reform debate
in Alaska will continue to be much ado about nothing.
Christopher T. Stidvent
258. Id.
